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Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action
Waivers Teach Us about Law-making
Rhonda Wasserman*
The Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion advanced an agenda found in neither the text nor the
legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act. Concepcion provoked
a maelstrom of reactions not only from the press and the academy, but
also from Congress, federal agencies, and lower courts, as they
struggled to interpret, apply, reverse, or cabin the Court’s blockbuster
decision. These reactions raise a host of provocative questions about
the relationships among the branches of government and between the
Supreme Court and the lower courts. Among other questions,
Concepcion and its aftermath force us to grapple with the relationship
between law and politics, the role of legislative history in statutory
interpretation, the meaning of legislative primacy, the influence of
federal agencies on the development of the law, and competing
conceptions of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the
lower courts.

* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I would like to thank Ian
Everhart and Nikolay Markov for diligent research assistance and perennial good cheer. I am
grateful to the editors of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for inviting me to
participate in the “Future of Class Actions and Its Alternatives” symposium, at which I presented
this Article, and to the symposium participants for their constructive feedback. Finally, I dedicate
this Article with much love to my parents, Deborah and Marvin Wasserman, on the occasion of
their sixtieth wedding anniversary.

391

3_WASSERMAN.DOCX

392

12/14/2012 3:59 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 393
I. CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT ............................................ 394
A. Congress Makes Law: The Federal Arbitration Act ............... 394
B. The Court Interprets the Law .................................................. 399
1. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. .... 402
2. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion .................................. 403
C. The Meaning of Legislative Inaction in the Face of Judicial
(Mis)interpretation .................................................................. 406
II. FEDERAL AGENCIES AND THE SUPREME COURT.............................. 411
A. The NLRB Interprets the National Labor Relations Act to
Preclude Class Action Waivers ............................................... 413
B. FINRA Bars Securities Firms from Enforcing Class Action
Waivers ................................................................................... 416
C. Chevron Deference, if Any, Owed to these Agency Actions.. 419
1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council .............................................................................. 420
2. Is FINRA a Government Agency Eligible for Chevron
Deference? ........................................................................ 422
3. Does the NLRB Ruling Have the Force of Law or
Procedural Formality to Qualify for Chevron
Deference? ........................................................................ 425
4. Do the NLRB Ruling and the FINRA Rules Trench
upon Federal Policies beyond the Agencies’ Authority? .. 428
III. THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS AND THE SUPREME COURT ............. 431
A. The Lower Courts as Change Agents ...................................... 432
B. The Lower Courts as Brakes on Change ................................. 433
1. State and Federal Courts Invalidate Representative
Action Waivers in PAGA Cases ....................................... 436
2. Federal Appeals Court Invalidates Class Action Waiver
in Antitrust Case ............................................................... 437
3. Lower Courts Read Concepcion Narrowly to
Preclude Categorical Rules ............................................... 439
4. Placing the Lower Court Decisions within a
Broader Theoretical Context ............................................. 440
CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 444

3_WASSERMAN.DOCX

2012]

12/14/2012 3:59 PM

Legal Process in a Box

393

INTRODUCTION
For many years, I taught a course called Legal Process, in which firstyear law students explored the roles played by Congress, the Supreme
Court, the President, administrative agencies, and state governments in
the law-making process. Among other topics, we discussed federalism
and the allocation of law-making authority between state and national
governments; institutional competency and the unique skills that each
branch of government brings to the law-making process; the role of
legislative history in statutory interpretation; and the deference that
courts owe to administrative agency interpretations of legislation within
their regulatory authority.
It is not much of an exaggeration to say that one could structure an
entire Legal Process course around class action waivers: contractual
provisions embedded in pre-dispute arbitration agreements by which a
consumer, employee or other party waives the right to present her claim
together with others (in a Rule 23 class action, a collective action under
the Fair Labor Standards Act or some other form of representative
action). Such a course could begin with an examination of the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA” or “Act”) 1 and its legislative history, and then
present different theories of statutory interpretation. The students could
then read the Supreme Court’s blockbuster decision in AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 2 which invoked a “breathtakingly broad view of
implied preemption” 3 to conclude that the FAA preempts state
unconscionability law upon which lower courts had relied to invalidate
class action waivers. 4 After examining the majority, concurring and
dissenting opinions, the students could debate whether the legal model
or the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making best explains the
result in Concepcion. 5 Finally, the course could present the reactions of
Congress, the federal agencies and the lower courts, as they have sought
to interpret, apply, reverse and cabin Concepcion. The students could
then debate a host of issues that these reactions raise. This Article will
present just three of the fascinating questions about law-making raised
by Concepcion and the governmental responses it provoked.
Part I will sketch the competing efforts by Congress and the Supreme
Court to regulate arbitration and collective action in the arbitration

1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
2. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
3. Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5.
4. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
5. See infra notes 303–16 and accompanying text (discussing the attitudinal model, legal
model, and principal-agent model of Supreme Court decision-making).
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context. While the conventional model vests ultimate lawmaking
authority in Congress, the actual relationship between Congress and the
Court is more complicated where, as here, the Court disregards
legislative intent in interpreting the law and Congress lacks the political
will to correct the mistake.
Next, Part II will examine the efforts by federal agencies to preserve
a right to participate in a class action notwithstanding Concepcion, and
the dilemma these agency actions present for the Court. Must the
Supreme Court accord Chevron deference to agency rulings and rules
that seek to preserve a right to collective action, or may the Court strike
down agency actions that it deems inconsistent with the FAA, as
interpreted by the Court itself?
Finally, Part III will present several lower court decisions rendered
after Concepcion and suggest that they challenge the traditional view
that the Supreme Court announces the law and the lower courts
obediently follow its precedents.
I. CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT
In my Legal Process course, we began with the basic proposition that
Congress has primary authority to craft social policy for the nation and
to make law, 6 while the Supreme Court has primary authority to
interpret the law when adjudicating cases. 7 But we then examined the
tension in the dynamic relationship between Congress and the Court, as
the Court decides whether to credit or ignore legislative history in the
interpretative process and as Congress considers whether to legislatively
overrule judicial decisions that interpret the law in a manner with which
Congress disagrees. This tension between Congress and the Court has
been acute as they have grappled with the enforceability of arbitration
agreements in general and class action waivers in particular.
A. Congress Makes Law: The Federal Arbitration Act
Before Congress acted in 1925, a party could sign a pre-dispute
6. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 333 (“For all its shortcomings, Congress remains the legitimate source of national
policy.”); Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 201 (1989) (“One of the central premises of the
Constitution’s division of powers, and the American system of government, is that primary
federal lawmaking authority belongs to Congress.”).
7. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation
of Powers, and the Line between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1055, 1055 (1999) (distinguishing between “a legislature’s power to enact laws and a
court’s authority to interpret them”); see also id. at 1089 (“[M]ajoritarian institutions enact rules
that apply generally to society, while courts apply those rules to individual litigants.”).
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arbitration agreement but then decline to honor it once a dispute arose. 8
Because courts declined to specifically enforce arbitration agreements, 9
parties had to litigate their disputes notwithstanding arbitration clauses.
Concerned even then about court congestion and the costs of
litigation, 10 Congress passed, and President Coolidge signed, the United
States Arbitration Act, 11 as the FAA was then known, to empower
courts to specifically enforce written arbitration agreements. The law
took effect on January 1, 1926. 12 Its drafters perceived the Act to be
procedural in nature, making the remedy of specific performance
available, but leaving the substantive law governing the parties’
contractual rights unaffected. 13 Modeled after statutes enacted in New
Jersey and New York, 14 the FAA declared written arbitration clauses in
commercial contracts to “be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 15 The
goal “was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
contracts, but not more so.” 16 To retain this parity, section two of the
Act authorized courts to invalidate arbitration agreements “upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any

8. See, e.g., Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REV. 265, 265, 276–77, 284 (1926) (stating that without this statute, arbitration
agreements would not be recognized and enforced by federal courts).
9. Id. at 276–77, 284. See also Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: J. Hearings on
S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 14
(1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Gen. Counsel for the N.Y.
State Chamber of Commerce); S. REP. NO. 68–536, at 2 (1924) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT];
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 20 (1992); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory
Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by
Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101, 104 (2006) (citing, inter alia, WESLEY A. STURGES, A
TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS 239–40 (1930)).
10. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 8, at 265, 269. See also Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 6–7
(statement of Charles L. Bernheimer); id. at 21 (letter from Herbert Hoover); id. at 26 (statement
of Alexander Rose); id. at 34–35 (brief submitted by Julius Henry Cohen); Sales and Contracts to
Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S.
4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 & 5 (1923)
(statement of Charles L. Bernheimer) [hereinafter 1923 Senate Hearing]; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 3.
11. U.S. Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (1947)).
12. 9 U.S.C. § 15. The law was codified and enacted into positive law in 1947. Act of July
30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669.
13. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]; Joint Hearings, supra note
9, at 37–38 (brief submitted by Julius Henry Cohen).
14. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 8, at 266 nn.3–4, 269 (citing 1923 N.J. Laws 291 and 1920
N.Y. Laws 803).
15. U.S. Arbitration Act § 2, 43 Stat. at 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2).
16. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967). See also
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 1 (“An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing
as other contracts . . . .”).
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contract,” 17 including fraud, duress or unconscionability. 18
Congress intended the Act to govern arbitration agreements between
merchants; that is, “parties presumed to be of approximately equal
bargaining strength . . . .” 19 According to Julius Henry Cohen, general
counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce and principal
drafter of the Act, 20 arbitration was
peculiarly suited to the disposition of the ordinary disputes between
merchants as to questions of fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery,
compliance with terms of payment, excuses for non-performance, and
the like. It has a place also in the determination of the simpler
questions of law—the questions of law which arise out of these daily
relations between merchants as to the passage of title, the existence of
warranties, or the questions of law which are complementary to the
questions of fact which we have just mentioned. 21

When Charles L. Bernheimer, Chair of the Committee on Arbitration of
the New York State Chamber of Commerce, testified before Congress
in favor of the Act, he too advocated arbitration as a means to reduce
the high litigation costs incurred by “merchants” or others “engaged in
business” who encounter “trade disputes.” 22 The legislative history
makes clear that the Act was not intended to govern employment
contracts. 23 Congressional power under the Commerce Clause was
“then thought to be far narrower than we have subsequently come to see
it,” 24 and Supreme Court case law at the time restricted it to those
“employment relationships “in which workers were actually engaged in

17. U.S. Arbitration Act § 2, 43 Stat. at 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2).
18. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (stating that
generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be
applied to invalidate arbitration agreements).
19. Moses, supra note 9, at 106; accord Amalia D. Kessler, Stuck in Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 2012, at A27 (“[T]he arbitration act was initially envisioned as applying primarily to
disputes between commercial equals . . . .”).
20. Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) (“Mr. Cohen . . . has had
charge of the actual drafting of the work.”); Moses, supra note 9, at 102.
21. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 8, at 281.
22. Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 6–7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer); see also id. at
12 (statement of R.S. French) (noting that the bill advances the interests of “large exporters and
importers”); 1923 Senate Hearing, supra note 10, at 3 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer)
(advocating arbitration for the “disposition of all business disputes”).
23. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 126 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that the legislative history “contain[s] [no] evidence that the proponents of the legislation
intended it to apply to agreements affecting employment”); id. at 128 (“[N]o one interested in the
enactment of the FAA ever intended or expected that § 2 would apply to employment
contracts.”); id. at 129 (concluding that the Act “was not intended to apply to employment
contracts at all”).
24. Id. at 133 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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interstate commerce.” 25 While most workers were therefore believed to
be beyond congressional reach and their contracts beyond the scope of
the proposed legislation, seamen and railroad workers worked in
interstate or foreign commerce. Representatives of the Seamen’s Union
expressed concern that employers would exploit their superior
bargaining power to place arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements with seamen and the proposed law would require courts to
enforce them. 26
During the 1923 Senate hearing, W.H.H. Piatt, the chair of the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) Committee that drafted the bill,
acknowledged the union’s concern that the law would compel
arbitration of disputes between stevedores and their employers. 27 Mr.
Piatt made clear, however, that
[i]t is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes,
at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the
privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their
damages are, if they want to do it. 28

To address the union’s concern, Mr. Piatt proposed adding language to
clarify that the law would not “apply to seamen or any class of workers
in interstate or foreign commerce.” 29 Then-Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover submitted a letter to Senator Thomas Sterling, who
chaired the subcommittee holding the hearing, proposing similar
language. 30 SB 1005, a revised bill introduced during the next session
of Congress in 1924, expressly stated that “nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.” 31 Congress passed the law with that language intact,32
25. Id. at 136. See also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating a federal
child labor law and holding that Congress’s Commerce power did not extend to employees
working intrastate to produce goods shipped interstate), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941).
26. See Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Annual Convention of the International Seaman’s
Union of America 203–04 (1923) (statement of the president of the International Seaman’s Union
of America) (contending that “[t]he personal hunger of the seaman, and the hunger of the wife
and children of the railroad man will surely tempt them to sign” such agreements), quoted in
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. 1923 Senate Hearing, supra note 10, at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. See id. at 14 (letter from Herbert Hoover) (proposing language to exclude employment
contracts of “seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce”).
31. S. 1005, 68th Cong. § 1 (1924), quoted in Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 2. See also
Donna Meredith Matthews, Employment Law after Gilmer: Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory
Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 368 (1997) (“[T]his exclusion
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explicitly exempting from the Act’s scope all employees then subject to
federal power under the Commerce Clause and assuming that all other
employees were beyond the law’s scope.
Just as the legislative history reveals congressional intent to exclude
employment agreements from the Act’s purview, so too does it reveal a
concern for voluntariness and an intent to exclude contracts of adhesion,
otherwise known as “take-it-or-leave-it” contracts. Senator Thomas
Walsh of Montana, a member of the Senate Subcommittee, expressed
concern during the 1923 Senate Hearing about contracts of adhesion,
identifying a variety of contracts “that are . . . really not voluntar[y],” 33
including insurance policies, shipping contracts, and building
contracts. 34 W.H.H. Piatt shared this concern, stating, “Speaking for
myself, personally, I would say I would not favor any kind of legislation
that would permit . . . forcing a man to sign that kind of a contract.”35
He went on to concede that contracts of adhesion “ought to be protested
against, because it is the primary end of this contract [sic] that it is a
contract between merchants one with another . . . .” 36 In other words,
the point of the statute was to enforce arbitration agreements between
merchants of roughly equal bargaining power, not arbitration clauses in
contracts of adhesion.
Senator Thomas Sterling of South Dakota, Chair of the Senate
Committee, reiterated concern regarding contracts of adhesion during
the 1924 Joint Hearings. He posited that a railroad might include an
arbitration clause in a shipping contract and then tell the shipper, “‘You
can take it or leave it, just as you please; but unless you sign you can not
ship.’” 37 Julius Cohen, the principal drafter of the bill, dismissed the
concern. 38 Seeking to assuage the Senator’s concern, Cohen cited the

clause was intended to assuage concerns by the very employees who might be affected—those
engag[ing] in interstate commerce. Because the Commerce Clause did not reach other
employment contracts, they were unaffected by the FAA.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering
the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the
Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259, 294 (“The evidence suggests . .
. that the 1925 Congress would have considered all workers subject to the commerce power as
within the employment exception.”).
32. See U.S. Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, § 1, 43 Stat. 883, 883 (1925) (containing the
exception for seamen and workers in interstate commerce).
33. 1923 Senate Hearing, supra note 10, at 9 (colloquy by Sen. Walsh during statement of
W.H.H. Piatt).
34. Id. at 9–11 (colloquy by Sen. Walsh during statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
35. Id. at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
36. Id.
37. Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Sen. Thomas Sterling).
38. Id. (statement of Julius Henry Cohen) (“There is nothing to that contention . . . .”).
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Bills of Lading Act, 39 which he claimed protected shippers by
prescribing the terms of a bill of lading. More generally, he suggested
that government regulations protect people “to-day as never before.” 40
[W]e have the regulation of the Federal Government, through its
regularly constituted bodies, and they protect everybody. Railroad
contracts and express contracts and insurance contracts are provided
for. You can not get a provision into an insurance contract to-day
unless it is approved by the insurance department. 41

In other words, the Act was not intended to validate arbitration clauses
in contracts of adhesion, but rather to render enforceable voluntary
arbitration agreements between merchants. 42 Cohen emphasized this
focus on voluntary agreements in a law review article he co-wrote
immediately after the law went into effect: “No one is required to make
an agreement to arbitrate. Such action by a party is entirely
voluntary.” 43
The FAA is silent on the issue of class-wide arbitration, and for good
reason. When Congress passed the Act in 1925, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure had not yet been promulgated and class action litigation
for damages was virtually unknown. 44 Thus, Congress gave no
apparent thought to the right of a group of similarly situated parties to
proceed collectively in arbitration or the enforceability of class action
waivers at the time it enacted the FAA. 45 There is no support
whatsoever in the legislative history for the proposition that Congress
intended the Act to displace state laws seeking to preserve the right of
consumers and others to proceed collectively.
B. The Court Interprets the Law
In the near-century since Congress enacted the FAA, the Supreme
Court through its interpretation of the Act has advanced its own agenda,
disregarding legislative history and congressional intent. Individual
Justices have openly bemoaned this development. In 1995, for

39. Billing of Lading Act, ch. 415, 39 Stat. 538 (1916) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§
80101–80116 (1994)).
40. Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
41. Id.
42. Moses, supra note 9, at 107. See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 42 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When the FAA was passed in 1925, I doubt that any
legislator who voted for it expected it to apply to . . . form contracts between parties of unequal
bargaining power . . . .”).
43. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 8, at 279.
44. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
45. Id.
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example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted: “[T]he Court has
abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect
to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own
creation.” 46 Even earlier, Justice John Paul Stevens commented that the
Court has done more than “put its own imprint” on the FAA:
[W]hen its refusal to look beyond the raw statutory text enables it to
disregard countervailing considerations that were expressed by
Members of the enacting Congress and that remain valid today, the
Court misuses its authority . . . . When the Court simply ignores the
interest of the unrepresented employee, it skews its interpretation with
its own policy preferences. 47

Even prior to Concepcion, the Court’s arbitration decisions were
replete with examples of judicial interpretation divorced from
congressional intent. In 2001, for example, the Court rejected the
contention that the Act should be limited to commercial deals or
merchant’s sales, 48 even though the chair of the ABA committee that
drafted the bill stated that its “primary end” was “a contract between
merchants one with another.” 49 The Court upheld the enforceability of
arbitration clauses in employment contracts 50 notwithstanding the Act’s
express exclusion of contracts of those working in foreign or interstate
commerce (the only employment contracts believed to be within
congressional control in 1925). 51 And the Court enforced arbitration
clauses in a variety of circumstances in which the parties had unequal

46. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
47. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132–33 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see id. at 132 (stating that “the Court’s interpretation of the Act has given it a scope far beyond
the expectations of the Congress that enacted it”). See also Moses, supra note 9, at 99–100
(noting that the FAA as interpreted by the Court today “would not likely have commanded a
single vote in the 1925 Congress”); Carrington & Haagen, supra note 6, at 402 (“[I]f the FAA
had been presented to Congress, as legislation having the effects ascribed to [it] by the Court . . .
[it would not] have been assured of a single vote of approval.”).
48. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Craft v.
Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1999), which read the phrase “transaction
involving commerce” in section two of the Act to connote “a commercial deal or merchant’s
sale”).
49. 1923 Senate Hearing, supra note 10, at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
50. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109 (interpreting the FAA to govern all employment
contracts except those of transportation workers, which are explicitly exempted by section one of
the Act); cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23, 25 n.2 (1991) (holding that
a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act “can be subjected to compulsory
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application” that
plaintiff was required to submit as a condition of employment, while disclaiming that the
application constituted an employment contract).
51. See supra notes 23–32 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
FAA).
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bargaining power. 52 In the Court’s view, “[m]ere inequality in
bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are [not] enforceable . . . .” 53 While the Act explicitly
declines to require enforcement where “‘such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract,’” 54 and while the Court
initially cautioned the lower courts to “‘remain attuned to wellsupported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from . . . fraud
or overwhelming economic power,’” 55 it has dismissed claims of
workers and consumers who maintained that they had little choice but to
accept an arbitration clause buried in a form contract in the absence of
proof of fraud or coercion. 56
In just the last two years, the Court has continued to substitute its
policy preferences for Congress’s, reading into the FAA its current
skepticism about class actions and collective litigation, notwithstanding
a complete dearth of evidence that Congress intended to mandate
enforcement of class action waivers. Although the Court has interpreted
the Act quite a few times in the last two years, 57 two decisions
52. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32–33 (rejecting plaintiff’s concern about unequal
bargaining power in the employment context); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 478, 484 (1989) (upholding the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a
“standard” brokerage agreement, which the customer suggested “was adhesive in nature,” as
applied to Securities Act claims); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230
(1987) (upholding the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a brokerage agreement as applied
to Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims, notwithstanding the customers’ general concern for
“broker overreaching”).
53. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33. See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995) (upholding the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a contract for termite removal
between an international company and a homeowner).
54. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
55. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985)).
56. See supra notes 50 and 52 and accompanying text (discussing case law upholding
arbitration clauses in employment contracts).
57. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012) (per
curiam) (holding that a state’s “prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personalinjury or wrongful-death claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration
of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA” and
is therefore preempted); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2012) (holding
that when a federal statute “is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable
forum, the FAA requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its terms”); KPMG
LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 26 (2011) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a complaint contains both
arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the Act requires courts to ‘compel arbitration of pendent
arbitrable claims . . . even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of
separate proceedings in different forums.’” (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 217 (1985))); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that the
FAA preempts a state rule that class action waivers in contracts of adhesion are unconscionable);
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (holding that when a contract vests
an arbitrator with exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the enforceability of the
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addressing class-wide arbitration are particularly noteworthy: StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. and AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion.
1. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.
Stolt-Nielsen involved a dispute between shipping companies and
their customers. 58
Following a criminal investigation by the
government that revealed the shipping companies were engaged in
illegal price-fixing, numerous charterers filed lawsuits against the
companies. One of these charterers, AnimalFeeds, filed a putative class
action in federal court against the shipping company, Stolt-Nielsen.
After the Second Circuit held that the contracts contained enforceable
arbitration clauses, 59 AnimalFeeds served upon Stolt-Nielsen a demand
for class arbitration. 60 While Stolt-Nielsen contested AnimalFeeds’s
right to represent a class in the arbitration, the parties entered into a
supplemental agreement to submit the question of class arbitration to a
panel of three arbitrators, who were to “follow and be bound by” 61 the
American Arbitration Association’s Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitrations (“AAA Class Rules”). AAA Class Rule 3 authorizes the
arbitrator to “determine as a threshold matter . . . whether the applicable
arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or
against a class.” 62
Although the parties had stipulated that the arbitration clause was
silent regarding class arbitration, 63 the panel of arbitrators concluded
that the clause permitted class-wide arbitration, 64 accepting
AnimalFeeds’s argument that “the clause should be construed to permit
class arbitration as a matter of public policy.” 65 Stolt-Nielsen
challenged the arbitrators’ decision in court, and the Supreme Court
held that the arbitrators had, in the language of the Act, “exceeded their
contract, it is for the arbitrator, not a court, to determine whether the contract is unconscionable).
See also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (holding
that parties that are silent on the issue of class-wide arbitration “cannot be compelled to submit
their dispute to class arbitration”). Cf. Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct.
2847, 2855–60 & n.6 (2010) (applying FAA precedents to an arbitration dispute in a labor case
under the Labor Management Relations Act “because they employ the same rules of
arbitrability”).
58. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764–65.
59. JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 175, 181 (2d Cir. 2004).
60. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765.
61. Id. (quoting the supplemental agreement).
62. AAA Class Rule 3 (effective Oct. 8, 2003).
63. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1766.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1768 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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powers.” 66 Finding that its prior decision in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle 67 did not establish “the rule to be applied in deciding
whether class arbitration is permitted,” 68 the Court concluded that “a
party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class
arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the
party agreed to do so.” 69
If an arbitration agreement is silent on the issue, the arbitrator cannot
infer an implicit agreement to submit to class-wide arbitration “because
class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree
that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing
to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.” 70 Class-wide arbitration not
only dramatically increases the scope and “commercial stakes” of the
proceedings, the Court maintained, but it also deprives parties of the
“presumption of privacy and confidentiality” that ordinarily shrouds
arbitration. 71 These “differences between bilateral and class-action
arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume . . . that the parties’
mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent
to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.” 72
2. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
In 2011, just one year after Stolt-Nielsen, the Court decided AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 73 The underlying claim in Concepcion
arose in 2002, when Vincent and Liza Concepcion purchased cell phone
service from AT&T. The Concepcions received free phones as
advertised by AT&T, but they were charged $30.22 in sales tax based
on the retail price of the phones. 74 They filed a suit against AT&T in a

66. Id. at 1767–68 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)).
67. 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003) (concluding that the arbitrator, rather than a court, should
interpret the arbitration clause to determine whether it forbade or was silent on class-wide
arbitration) (plurality opinion).
68. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 1775.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1776 (citing AAA Class Rule 9(a)).
72. Id. (footnote omitted).
73. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). For analyses of Concepcion and its implications, see Michael A.
Helfand, Purpose, Precedent, and Politics: Why Concepcion Covers Less Than You Think, 4 Y.B.
ARB. & MEDIATION (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2022564; Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 636–39 (2012); Sherry, supra
note 3, at 3, 5–21; Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 705–17 (2012); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class
Arbitration after Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 776–81 (2012).
74. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
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federal court in California, which was later consolidated with a putative
class action. 75 AT&T moved to compel arbitration, invoking the
contract between the parties, which contained an arbitration provision
requiring the parties to proceed in their “‘individual capacity, and not as
a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative
proceeding.’” 76 Opposing the motion to compel arbitration, the
plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable
under California law because it barred class-wide procedures. 77
The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, applying
the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior
Court 78 and finding that the arbitration provision was unconscionable
because it did not “provide an ‘adequate substitute for class litigation or
arbitration.’” 79 The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 80
The Discover Bank rule applied by the lower federal courts provided
as follows:
[W]hen the [class action] waiver is found in a consumer contract of
adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged
that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of
individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in
practice the exemption of the party “from responsibility for [its] own
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.” Under
these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under
California law and should not be enforced. 81

The Concepcions argued that the Discover Bank rule was not preempted
by the FAA because it barred waivers of class action litigation as well
as class-wide arbitration, and therefore did not discriminate against
arbitration. 82

75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting the arbitration provision) (conversion from all capital letters by the Court).
77. Id. at 1745.
78. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
79. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS AJB, 2008 WL 5216255, at *9 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009),
rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740, on remand sub nom. Laster v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc., 06CV675 DMS NLS, 2012 WL 1681762 (S.D. Cal. May 9, 2012) (granting AT&T’s motion
to compel arbitration). See also Laster, 2012 WL 1681762 , at *14 (concluding that plaintiffs had
established the unconscionability of the class action waiver).
80. Laster, 584 F.3d at 855–59.
81. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668).
82. Brief for Respondents at 21–24, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893) (citing
Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 699, 708, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)).
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The Supreme Court disagreed. While noting that section two of the
FAA “permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable
‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract,’” the Court clarified that this saving clause permits
invalidation of arbitration clauses only by “generally applicable contract
defenses,” not “by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive
their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” 83
Obviously, when state law bars the arbitration of a particular type of
claim completely, the FAA preempts the state law. 84 The Court held,
however, that the FAA’s preemptive force may also extend to generally
applicable grounds for the revocation of a contract, such as
unconscionability, where they are “applied in a fashion that disfavors
arbitration.” 85 For example, the Court hypothesized, if state law
characterized as unconscionable any contract that eschewed application
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rule might formally apply to all
contracts but it “would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration
agreements . . . .” 86 More generally, section two’s saving clause was
not intended “to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.” 87
While conceding that the “‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to
‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to
their terms,’” 88 the Court emphasized a subsidiary goal:
“‘encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution.’” 89 Classwide arbitration imposed by a court applying the Discover Bank rule
interferes with this goal, the Court opined, in three material respects.
First, “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the
process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural
morass than final judgment.” 90 The Court cited evidence from the
AAA that the median time for resolution of a class-wide arbitration was
583 days, more than three times longer than the average disposition
83. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 1747 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)). See also Marmet Health
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012) (per curium) (holding that the FAA
preempts West Virginia case law, which treats pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate personal injury
or wrongful death claims against nursing homes as categorically unenforceable).
85. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1748.
88. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989)).
89. Id. at 1749 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
90. Id. at 1751.
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time for bilateral consumer arbitrations. 91 Second, “class arbitration
requires procedural formality” in order to bind absentees by the award,
which, the Court suggested, is at odds with the goal of resolving
disputes efficiently and speedily. 92 Third, “class arbitration greatly
increases risks to defendants” by multiplying the potential cost of a
losing award while denying effective appellate review, thereby
pressuring defendants to settle even questionable claims and
discouraging the use of arbitration altogether. 93 The Court concluded
that California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA because
it “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress” 94
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, focused on the basic purpose of the FAA—to ensure
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements 95—and downplayed the
importance of providing “procedural and cost advantages.” 96 Breyer
rejected the majority’s assumption that individual, rather than class,
arbitration is a “fundamental attribute” of arbitration, 97 maintaining
instead that “class arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration.” 98
To the extent that Congress envisioned arbitration as a tool for resolving
factual disputes between parties of roughly equal bargaining power,
California’s unconscionability law may actually further congressional
objectives. 99 And since class arbitration proceedings may take less time
than class actions in court, the Discover Bank rule may even serve the
FAA’s (subsidiary) objective of facilitating speedy resolution of
disputes. 100 In response to the dissent, the majority rejoined that “States
cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it
is desirable for unrelated reasons.” 101
C. The Meaning of Legislative Inaction in the Face of Judicial
(Mis)interpretation
As demonstrated in Part I.A above, the FAA’s legislative history
strongly suggests that Congress intended to limit the Act’s provisions to
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1752 & n.8.
Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1759.
Id. at 1758.
Id. at 1759 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1759–60.
Id. at 1753 (majority opinion).
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contracts between companies of roughly equal bargaining power, and
never intended it to apply to employment agreements or take-it-orleave-it consumer contracts. 102 Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that
Congress even contemplated class action litigation at the time it enacted
the FAA, let alone that it specifically intended to permit class action
waivers.
But if the Court has “trespass[ed] on the institutions of democratic
government” 103 by disregarding congressional intent, surely Congress
has the prerogative to amend the FAA and to legislatively overrule
Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion and the Court’s decisions extending the FAA
to employment and consumer contracts. 104 After all, Congress has
primary law-making authority and “‘Congress remains free to alter what
[the Court] ha[s] done.’” 105 As the late Harvard Law professors Hart
and Sacks maintained in their legendary teaching materials, The Legal
Process, “court and legislature are in some sense in competition, with
the legislature having the last word for the future.” 106 Or as Columbia
Law professors Gluck and Graetz put it even more directly in a recent
New York Times op-ed piece, “It is Congress, not the court, that has the
constitutional power and responsibility to make difficult legislative
policy decisions . . . .” 107
At least some members of the current Congress would like to reassert
legislative primacy by amending the FAA to limit its reach, consistent
with the legislature’s original intent. Indeed, the very day that the
Supreme Court decided Concepcion, Senator Al Franken (D-Minn.),
Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Representative Hank
Johnson (D-Ga.) announced that they would reintroduce the Arbitration

102. See supra notes 19–43 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
FAA).
103. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 6, at 402.
104. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) (applying the FAA to an employment
contract; superseding state law); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)
(applying the FAA to a consumer contract).
105. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 419 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
106. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 165 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
Foundation Press 1994) (emphasis added); see also id. at 166 (describing the legislature’s
discretion to intervene “to determine changes appropriate for the future”).
107. Abbe R. Gluck & Michael J. Graetz, The Severability Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2012, at A29 (writing about the Affordable Care Act before the Supreme Court had issued its
decision upholding the law in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).
See also Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 317, 317 (2005) (describing “legislative supremacy” as “the belief that Congress, rather
than the Supreme Court, bears primary responsibility for shaping policy through statutory law”).
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Fairness Act (“AFA”). 108 Their press release explicitly stated that the
proposed law would “help rectify the Court’s most recent wrong [in
Concepcion] by restoring consumer rights.” 109 The proposed bill would
do far more than just ensure that groups can band together to proceed
collectively against employers or other companies. 110 If signed into
law, the AFA would invalidate all pre-dispute agreements that require
the arbitration of an employment dispute, a consumer dispute or a civil
rights dispute and would vest authority to determine the validity of such
agreements in “a court, rather than an arbitrator.” 111
In its “Findings” section, the AFA states that the FAA was “intended
to apply to disputes between commercial entities of generally similar
sophistication and bargaining power,” 112 not to consumer disputes or
employment disputes. The AFA seeks to legislatively overrule a “series
of decisions by the Supreme Court” that “have changed the meaning of
the Act.” 113 Although the bill has been referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 114 earlier versions 115 never made it out of
committee 116 and the current version is not expected to be adopted. 117

108. Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011).
109. Press Release, Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. Hank Johnson Announce Legislation
Giving Consumers More Power in the Courts against Corporations (Apr. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1466.
110. Christopher Drahozal, Concepcion and the Arbitration Fairness Act, SCOTUSBLOG
(Sept. 13, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/concepcion-and-thearbitration-fairness-act (arguing that the AFA “would be an overbroad response to the Court’s
decision in Concepcion”). See also John D. Wood, Opening the Door to Justice: Amending the
Federal Arbitration Act to Remedy the Unjust Use of Predispute Arbitration Agreements (Feb.
2011) (unpublished student paper, N.Y.U. Law School), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2014428 (espousing an earlier version of the AFA).
111. S. 987 § 3(a); H.R. 1873 § 3(a). The section that would authorize courts, rather than
arbitrators, to determine the “validity and enforceability” of arbitration agreements would
overrule Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), which concluded that an
arbitrator, rather than a court, should interpret the arbitration clause to determine whether it
forbade or was silent on class-wide arbitration. A narrower legislative fix to address only class
action waivers might be (mis)read to suggest that Congress actually endorses the application of
the FAA in employment and consumer contracts and other contracts between parties of unequal
bargaining power. Kathryn A. Eidmann, Ledbetter in Congress: The Limits of a Narrow
Legislative Override, 117 YALE L.J. 971, 972, 979 (2008).
112. S. 987 § 2; H.R. 1873 § 2.
113. S. 987 § 2; H.R. 1873 § 2.
114. See H.R. 1873, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1873 (last
visited Nov. 18, 2012) (noting that the bill was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary
on May 12, 2011).
115. S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 931, 111th Cong.
(2009); H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
116. See S. 1782 (110th): Bill Overview, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/110/s1782 (last visited Sep. 30, 2011) (listing S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007) as
introduced on July 12, 2007, but never enacted); H.R. 3010 (110th): Bill Overview, GOVTRACK,
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In some cases, Congress’s failure to legislatively overrule a judicial
interpretation of a statute has been read to signify acquiescence in the
Court’s interpretation, 118 although many reasons apart from
congressional approval may explain legislative inaction. 119 For
example, when Congress is unaware of the Court’s interpretation of a
statute, it is not reasonable to ascribe an intention to affirm the judicial
interpretation. 120 Here, however, given that members of Congress have
introduced the AFA in three successive sessions of Congress in an effort
to overrule some of the Court’s FAA precedents, it would be difficult to
maintain that Congress lacks knowledge of the Court’s decisions. 121
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr3010 (last visited Sep. 30, 2011) (listing H.R. 3010,
110th Cong. (2007) as introduced on July 12, 2007, but never enacted); S. 931 (111th): Bill
Overview, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s931 (last visited Sep. 30,
2011) (listing S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009) as introduced on April 29, 2009, but never enacted);
H.R. 1020 (111th): Bill Overview, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/
hr1020 (last visited Sep. 30, 2011) (listing H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) as introduced on
February 12, 2009, but never enacted).
117. See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 110 (“[T]he political realities are such that Congress is
unlikely to enact the AFA.”); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 73, at 629 (“[S]imilar bills have died
in committee before, and the prospects for this one appear no brighter.”). In fact, GovTrack.us
gives it only a 2% chance of passage.
H.R. 1873: Bill Overview, GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1873 (last visited Sep. 30, 2011). A proposed
California state bill that would have barred class action waivers died in committee in July 2012.
Cheryl Miller, Legislation to Blunt “Concepcion” is Killed in State Assembly, THE RECORDER
(July 3, 2012, 3:26:14 PM), http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleFriendlyCA.jsp?id=
1202561826154.
118. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972) (“Congress, by its positive
inaction, has allowed [the Court’s] decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference
and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively.”); Barrett,
supra note 107, at 322 (describing “the belief that congressional inaction following the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of a statute reflects congressional acquiescence in it”) (footnote omitted);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 69, 71 (1988)
[hereinafter Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction] (describing the acquiescence rule, the
reenactment rule and the rejected proposal rule, all of which read meaning into legislative
inaction); Marshall, supra note 6, at 184 (“[C]ongressional failure to enact legislation reversing a
judicial decision indicates Congress’ approval of the Court’s interpretation of an earlier statute.”).
119. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 107, at 335–36 (identifying alternative explanations for
legislative inaction; “[e]quating the failure to act with agreement reflects a simple and complete
misunderstanding of the legislative process.”); Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra
note 118, at 69 (questioning “whether legislative inaction really does tell the Court, or us,
anything about legislative intent”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76
GEO. L.J. 1361, 1404–06 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents]
(identifying a variety of reasons why Congress might have failed to overrule judicial
interpretations of a federal statute); Marshall, supra note 6, at 190–91 (identifying a number of
reasons “why Congress might decline to overrule a decision with which most members
disagree”).
120. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 107, at 331–35 (discussing ignorance as a reason for
rejecting the acquiescence rationale); Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 118,
at 75–76 (same); Marshall, supra note 6, at 186–90 (same).
121. But see Marshall, supra note 6, at 189 (questioning the assumption “that just because . . .
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Even where Congress is aware of a judicial (mis)interpretation of a
statute and fails to correct it, its inaction may reflect “preoccupation, or
paralysis” 122 rather than acquiescence or affirmation. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has frequently questioned the wisdom of reading
acquiescence or approval into legislative inaction. 123 As Professor
Eskridge has noted, because many obstacles impede the passage of
legislation by Congress, “even if a majority of the members of Congress
disagree with a judicial or administrative interpretation of a statute, it is
very unlikely that they will be able to amend the statute quickly, if at
all.” 124
Moreover, whatever little legislative inaction tells us about
congressional intent, it reveals only the intent of the Congress that failed
to act, not the intent of the enacting Congress, whose intent is
traditionally viewed as most relevant for purposes of statutory
interpretation. 125 As the Court has noted, “‘the views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier
one.’” 126 Therefore, even if the 113th Congress declines to pass the
AFA, it does not mean that the Court in Concepcion correctly

a bill is proposed, a great many members of Congress are aware of the issue”).
122. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 n.21 (1969); accord Marshall, supra note 6, at 190–91.
Given the recent “hyperpolarization of Congress,” there have been fewer Congressional overrides
and a dramatic increase in the Supreme Court’s power. Adam Liptak, In Congress’s Paralysis, A
Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, at A10 (quoting N.Y.U School of Law
Professor Richard H. Pildes).
123. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 78 (1974) (“‘The search for significance in
the silence of Congress is too often the pursuit of a mirage . . . .’” (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio
v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942))). See also Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119–20 (1940)
(“To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to
venture into speculative unrealities.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 121 (“[W]e walk on quicksand
when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.”).
124. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 118, at 99.
125. See id. at 94–95 (describing Congress as a “discontinuous decisionmaker” and
identifying the “traditional proposition that the legislative ‘intent’ relevant to statutory
interpretation is the intent of the enacting Congress”); Marshall, supra note 6, at 188, 193 (noting
the courts generally adhere to an “originalist model of statutory construction,” trying to
understand what the enacting Congress intended with the words it chose). In addition to debating
the meaning of legislative inaction, the Legal Process students could debate whether it is the
enacting Congress’s intent that is most relevant for purposes of statutory interpretation, or
whether statutes should be interpreted “dynamically,” that is, “in light of their present societal,
political, and legal context.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory
Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 46 (1988) (“[S]tatutes ought to be responsive to today’s
world.”); Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1095, 1144 (1993) (“[P]ostenactment developments would have provided a reliable tool for
interpreting the statutes at issue.”).
126. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (quoting United States
v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).
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interpreted the FAA or furthered the intent of the Congress that enacted
the law in 1925.
Finally, even if legislative inaction tells us little, if anything, about
the enacting Congress’s actual intent, in some cases it may support a
finding of presumed intent. Professor Eskridge has reformulated the
Court’s “legislative inaction” cases to impose upon Congress a
responsibility to correct authoritative interpretations with which it
disagrees. 127 On this reading, Congress’s failure to legislatively
overrule “building block” judicial interpretations upon which others
reasonably rely gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the Court’s
interpretation was correct. 128
But Eskridge maintains that the
“presumption of correctness should be a weak one [if the interests
harmed by the Court’s interpretation] do not have effective access to the
political process.” 129 Unlike small, well-defined, wealthy groups (e.g.,
phone companies) that have resources to invest in the legislative process
to secure concentrated benefits and to avoid concentrated costs,
consumers (such as the Concepcions and other subscribers to AT&T
phone service) are too diffuse, disorganized and poor to lobby Congress
to change (an interpretation of) the law with which they disagree.
In sum, the class action waiver material would invite the Legal
Process students to consider the competing roles of Congress and the
Court in law-making; the traditional view that Congress has primary
responsibility for federal law- and policy-making while the Court has
primary responsibility for interpreting federal legislation; the proper
role of legislative history in the interpretive process; and the meaning of
legislative inaction in the face of judicial (mis)interpretation.
We say that Congress makes the law and the Court interprets the law;
but if the Court can ignore legislative intent and interpret legislation in
such a way as to render it unrecognizable to the Congress that enacted
the law, and if Congress lacks the political will to correct the Court’s
action, is it accurate to maintain that Congress retains primary lawmaking power? At least regarding class action waivers, it sure looks
like the Court, not Congress, is making the law.
II. FEDERAL AGENCIES AND THE SUPREME COURT
Just as class action waivers provide a window into Congress’s

127. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 118, at 108–13.
128. Id. at 108.
129. Id. at 114. See also Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 119, at 1406–
07 (applying public choice theory to explain legislative inaction); Marshall, supra note 6, at 190
(discussing public choice theory).
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struggle to retain primary law-making authority vis-à-vis the Court, they
offer an opportunity to consider the role that administrative agencies
play in law-making and the extent to which courts must defer to agency
interpretations of the laws within their purview. 130 This Part of the
Article focuses on two federal agencies, the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) and the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (“FINRA”), which have invalidated class action waivers in
the context of labor and securities disputes, respectively. 131 In the
words of Professor Paul Kirgis: “These agencies are, in effect, telling
the courts to reopen the doors and start hearing cases. The result is a
through-the-looking-glass moment in which agencies defend rights to

130. See infra Part II.C (applying Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984) and its progeny).
131. I first learned of these agency actions in an on-line essay by Professor Paul Kirgis. See
Paul F. Kirgis, The Roberts Court vs. the Regulators: Surveying Arbitration’s Next Battleground,
10 MAYHEW-HITE REP. ON DISP. RESOL. & CTS. (May 2012), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/epub/
mayhew-hite/report/volume-10/issue-3/. In addition to the efforts by the NLRB and FINRA to
regulate class action waivers, at least one other agency has sought to regulate pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which enforces the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12 (2012), has interpreted the MMWA to
bar “pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration provisions covering written warranty agreements”
and has promulgated a regulation to prohibit “judicial enforcement of such provisions with
respect to consumer claims brought under the MMWA.” Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto
Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 16 C.F.R. 703.5), withdrawn, 676 F.3d 867
(9th Cir. 2012). Until recently, the Courts of Appeals were split on whether the FTC’s
interpretation of the MMWA is entitled to Chevron deference. Compare Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1031
(deferring to the FTC’s interpretation), with Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470,
478 & n.14 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that Congress spoke directly to the issue of binding
arbitration in the FAA and declining to even reach the second step of the Chevron analysis), and
Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002) (determining “that the
FTC’s interpretation of the MMWA is unreasonable” and declining to defer to the FTC
regulation). The Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion in Kolev in April 2012. See also Jonathan D.
Grossberg, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the Federal Arbitration Act, and the Future of
Consumer Protection, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 661 (2008) (“[T]he MMWA and its
interpretation by the FTC preclude binding arbitration agreements . . . . [T]he courts owe
Chevron deference to the FTC in this area . . . .”); Arbitration—Fifth Circuit Holds MagnusonMoss Warranty Act Claims Arbitrable Despite Contrary Agency Interpretation.—Walton v. Rose
Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002), 116 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2003)
(criticizing Walton’s “flawed rationale,” but not its conclusion). Moreover, in the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress authorized the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to study the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer
transactions and to promulgate regulations prohibiting such agreements if it “finds that such a
prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the
protection of consumers.” 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2006). In April 2012, the CFPB solicited
comments from the public in an effort to “identify the appropriate scope, methods, and sources of
data for the Study” required by Dodd-Frank. Request for Information Regarding Scope,
Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 77
Fed. Reg. 25148 (Apr. 27, 2012). Comments were due on June 23, 2012.
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court adjudication against incursions by the Supreme Court.” 132
Following an examination of the steps taken by these agencies, this Part
analyzes the obligation, if any, of courts to defer to them and the
Supreme Court’s particular dilemma: must it defer to agency
interpretations that conflict with its own powerfully pro-arbitration
agenda?
A. The NLRB Interprets the National Labor Relations Act to Preclude
Class Action Waivers
In a decision of first impression issued in a proceeding against D.R.
Horton, Inc. (“Horton”), 133 the NLRB considered whether Horton could
require its employees, as a condition of employment, to agree to refrain
from pursuing any claims against it other than through individual
arbitration. The Board held that an employer violates section 8(a)(1) of
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) when it “requires
employees covered by the Act, as a condition of their employment, to
sign an agreement that precludes them from filing joint, class, or
collective claims addressing their wages, hours or other working
conditions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial.” 134
In other words, the NLRB held that the class action waiver Horton
required its employees to sign violated the NLRA.
In so ruling, the Board relied on section 7 of the NLRA, which
assures employees a right to engage in “concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,”135
and which has been interpreted to protect their right to join together to
collectively pursue workplace grievances through litigation 136 or
arbitration. 137 Since the agreement at issue explicitly barred employees
from bringing collective claims in any forum, and since section 8(a)(1)
of the NLRA “makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer ‘to
interfere with . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in’

132. Kirgis, supra note 131.
133. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *10 & n.18 (Jan. 3, 2012) (distinguishing
two cases that had held that class action waivers do not violate the NLRA: Slawienski v. Nephron
Pharm. Corp., No. 1:10-CV-0460-JEC, 2010 WL 5186622 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2010); and Webster
v. Perales, No. 3:07-CV-00919-M, 2008 WL 282305 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2008)).
134. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
136. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *2 (citing, inter alia, Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978), and Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co., 42 NLRB 942, 948–49 (1942)).
137. Id. at *3 (citing, inter alia, NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 836 (1984)).
See also id. at *9 (construing employees’ class and collective actions as protected concerted
activity because their goal is concerted activity for mutual aid or protection).

3_WASSERMAN.DOCX

414

12/14/2012 3:59 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

Section 7,” 138 the Board held that the contract violated section 8 of the
NLRA. 139 In short, “the prohibition of individual agreements imposed
on employees as a means of requiring that they waive their right to
engage in protected, concerted activity lies at the core of the
prohibitions contained in Section 8.” 140
The NLRB rejected the company’s principal argument that its
decision conflicted with the FAA and the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Concepcion. Cognizant of its obligation to seek to accommodate the
policies underlying both the NLRA and the FAA, the Board offered
four reasons why its finding that the class action waiver was unlawful
did not conflict with the FAA or its underlying policies. 141
First, ruling that a class action waiver violates the NLRA does not
discriminate against arbitration because it “does not rest on ‘defenses
that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact
that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’” 142 Even a contract that failed
to mention arbitration, but which barred employees from pursuing class
actions in court, would violate the NLRA under the Board’s
reasoning. 143
Second, Supreme Court precedents make clear that agreements to
arbitrate federal statutory claims “may not require a party to ‘forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute.’” 144 Here, even though the
charging party, Michael Cuda, ultimately claimed the protection of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), he first claimed a right to present
the FLSA claim collectively, a substantive right itself secured by the
NLRA. 145 Since the class action waiver interfered with the exercise of
this substantive right, the FAA did not require enforcement of the
waiver. 146
Third, under the FAA, arbitration agreements may be invalidated
upon any “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract,” 147 and the Board noted that “it is a defense to contract
138. Id. at *4 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012)).
139. Id. at *6 (opining that the agreement at issue here “implicates prohibitions that predate
the NLRA and are central to modern Federal labor policy”).
140. Id. at *5.
141. Id. at *7–12.
142. Id. at *9 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at *12 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).
See also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.
2012)).
145. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *12.
146. Id. at *11–13.
147. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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enforcement that a term of the contract is against public policy.” 148 In
cases raising this defense, courts must balance the “interest in favor of
enforcing a contract term” against the public policy that would be
violated by its enforcement. 149 The NLRA embodies a strong federal
policy protecting employees’ rights to collectively pursue litigation or
arbitration, as well as a strong policy against “yellow dog” contracts,
which would require employees to waive rights to engage in collective
action. 150 While recognizing that Concepcion emphasized a
countervailing interest in facilitating streamlined proceedings, the Board
distinguished the present case from Concepcion. 151 There, tens of
thousands of consumers had potential claims against the phone
company, whereas the average employer has only twenty employees.
Thus, class-wide arbitration of an employment case would be far less
costly and cumbersome than the massive class-wide proceeding feared
by the Court in Concepcion. “[H]olding that an employer violates the
NLRA by requiring employees, as a condition of employment, to waive
their right to pursue collective legal redress in both judicial and arbitral
forums accommodates the policies underlying both the NLRA and the
FAA to the greatest extent possible.” 152
Finally, the Board invoked an earlier labor statute, the NorrisLaGuardia Act (“NLGA”), which ensures workers “full freedom of
association” and protects them “from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers” in “concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 153 Section 4 of
the NLGA protects the rights of persons, singly or collectively, to aid
any person interested or participating in any labor dispute who is
prosecuting any action in any federal or state court. 154 Since the NLGA
was enacted after the FAA, and since it explicitly repeals all acts and
parts of acts in conflict with its provisions, 155 the Board concluded that
the “FAA would have to yield” if there were a “direct conflict” between
the FAA and the NLGA. 156
Final orders of the NLRB, like its decision in D.R. Horton, are

148. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *11 (citing Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S.
386, 392 (1987)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at *5.
151. Id. at *12.
152. Id.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
154. Id. § 104(d).
155. Id. § 115.
156. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *12.
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subject to review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Circuit in
which the unfair labor practice occurred or a person aggrieved by the
order resides or transacts business, or in the D.C. Circuit. 157 Horton’s
Petition for Review of the NLRB decision, filed in the Fifth Circuit on
January 13, 2012, is still pending. 158
Following discussion in Part II.B below of the action taken by
FINRA to rein in class action waivers, Part II.C will consider the
amount of deference to which these agency actions are entitled and the
Court’s current dilemma.
B. FINRA Bars Securities Firms from Enforcing Class Action Waivers
FINRA describes itself as “the largest independent regulator for all
securities firms doing business in the United States.” 159 It was formed
in 2007, when the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
approved the merger of the enforcement arms of the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”) and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(“NASD”). 160 While both the NYSE and the NASD began as voluntary
organizations of broker-dealers and operated for decades as selfregulating organizations (“SROs”), 161 the Securities Acts Amendments
of 1975 gave the SEC greater authority to regulate and supervise
them. 162
From its inception, FINRA “was designed as a monopoly SRO under
the active and direct oversight of the SEC.” 163 Since 1987, when the
Supreme Court held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were enforceable, 164
virtually all disputes between broker-dealers and their customers have
been arbitrated under FINRA supervision. 165

157. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012).
158. Petition for Review, D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2012) (No. 12-60031)
(on file with author).
159. About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited July 10, 2012).
160. Carrie Johnson, SEC Approves One Watchdog For Brokers Big and Small, WASH. POST,
July 27, 2007, at D1; Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 151–52
(2008). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012) (authorizing the SEC to grant the registration of selfregulatory organizations).
161. Karmel, supra note 160, at 153, 158.
162. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97.
163. Karmel, supra note 160, at 152. See also id. at 169 (noting that FINRA is “very close” to
qualifying as a government agency).
164. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227–38 (1987).
165. Kirgis, supra note 131. See also Karmel, supra note 160, at 153 (noting that the NYSE
and the NASD “operated arbitration facilities for disputes between member firms and their
employees and between member firms and their customers.”).
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FINRA Rule 2268(d)(3), effective December 5, 2011, 166 provides
that no pre-dispute arbitration agreement shall include any condition
that “limits the ability of a party to file a claim in court permitted to be
filed in court under the rules of the forums in which a claim may be
filed under the agreement.” 167 The FINRA Code of Arbitration
Procedure, which contains “the rules of [a forum] in which a claim may
be filed” under a securities-related arbitration agreement, bars member
firms from
enforc[ing] any arbitration agreement against a member of a certified
or putative class action with respect to any claim that is the subject of
the certified or putative class action until: The class certification is
denied; The class is decertified; The member of the certified or
putative class is excluded from the class by the court; or The member
of the certified or putative class elects not to participate in the class or
withdraws from the class according to conditions set by the court, if
any. 168

Taken together, these provisions guarantee customers the right to bring
class actions against brokerage firms in court and bar the enforcement
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements regarding claims that are the
subject of class litigation. 169

166. FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-19 (Apr. 2011); FINRA, Rule Conversion Chart: NASD to
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ruleconversionchart/ (last updated Feb. 9, 2012). The predecessor
to FINRA Rule 2268(d) was NASD Rule 3110, which was approved by the SEC in the late
1980s. Charles Schwab & Co. v. FINRA, No. C-12-518EDL, 2012 WL 1859030, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. May 11, 2012).
167. FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes Rule 2268(d)(3),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9955.
168. FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes Rule 12204(d),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4110. See also
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes Rule 13204(d),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4207
(valid
through July 8, 2012) (similar provision governing industry disputes). In April 2012, the SEC
approved an amendment of Rule 13204 to preclude the arbitration under the FINRA Industry
Code of collective claims under the FLSA, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act or the
Equal Pay Act. See Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of a Proposed Rule Change, As Modified By Amendment No. 1, Amending Rule 13204
of the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes to Preclude Collective Action Claims
From Being Arbitrated, SEC Release No. 34-66774, 77 Fed. Reg. 22374, 22375 (April 13, 2012);
see also FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes Rule 13204,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&record_id=14570 (effective
July 9, 2012).
169. Kirgis, supra note 131. See also FINRA Rule 2268(f), http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9955 (“All agreements shall include a
statement that ‘No person shall . . . seek to enforce any pre-dispute arbitration agreement against
any person who has initiated in court a putative class action; or who is a member of a putative
class . . . until: (i) the class certification is denied; or (ii) the class is decertified; or (iii) the
customer is excluded from the class by the court.’”).

3_WASSERMAN.DOCX

418

12/14/2012 3:59 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

In approving the section of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure
that was the predecessor to this section of the FINRA Code of
Arbitration Procedure, the SEC commented
that the judicial system has already developed the procedures to
manage class action claims. Entertaining such claims through
arbitration . . . would be difficult, duplicative and wasteful . . . . The
Commission agrees with the NASD’s position that, in all cases, class
actions are better handled by the courts and that investors should have
access to the courts to resolve class actions efficiently.
The Commission finds that the proposed rule change . . . is
consistent with the requirements of Section 15A(b)(6) of the
[Securities Exchange] Act . . . [which] requires . . . that the rules of the
NASD be designed to protect investors and the public interest . . . .
The Commission believes that investor access to the courts should be
preserved for class actions . . . . 170

Notwithstanding the FINRA Rules assuring brokerage customers a
right to pursue class litigation in court even in the face of a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement, the brokerage firm Charles Schwab (“Schwab”)
inserted a class action waiver in its account agreement in the aftermath
of Concepcion and distributed it to almost seven million customers.171
On February 1, 2012, the FINRA Department of Enforcement filed a
disciplinary proceeding against Charles Schwab, alleging that its class
action waiver violates FINRA Rule 2268(d)(3). 172 On the very same
day, Schwab filed a declaratory judgment action against FINRA in
federal court, maintaining that the FINRA Rule does not bar class action
waivers, and even if it does, the Supreme Court’s decisions in
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood 173 and Concepcion prevent FINRA
from enforcing the Rule. 174

170. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions
From Arbitration Proceedings, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31371, 1992 WL 324491, at *3
(Oct. 28, 1992) [hereinafter SEC Release] (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
171. Complaint & Request for Expedited Hearing ¶¶ 12–13, Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles
Schwab & Co., Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2011029760201 (Feb. 1, 2012) [hereinafter FINRA
Complaint], http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@ad/documents/industry/p125
516.pdf.
172. Id. ¶¶ 3, 20, 26 & 32. The FINRA Complaint also alleges violations of FINRA Rules
2268(d)(1) and 2010. Id. ¶¶ 4–6, 20, 26 & 32. The filing of a complaint is just the first step in a
five-stage disciplinary process for the regulation of broker-dealers, which includes administrative
review of FINRA’s ruling on the complaint by the SEC and judicial review by a federal appellate
court. See Charles Schwab & Co. v. FINRA, No. C–12–518 EDL, 2012 WL 1859030, at *2, *5
(N.D. Cal. May 11, 2012).
173. 132 S. Ct. 665, 672–73 (2012) (holding that claims under the Credit Repair Organization
Act are arbitrable notwithstanding a non-waiver provision in the statute).
174. Complaint for Declaratory and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 34–39,
Charles Schwab & Co. v. FINRA, No. 3:12-CV-00518-EDL, 2012 WL 1859030 (N.D. Cal.
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On May 11, 2012, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California granted FINRA’s motion to dismiss the complaint
without leave to amend. 175 Schwab’s failure to exhaust the FINRA
administrative process, which culminates in administrative review by
the SEC and then judicial review by a federal court of appeals, deprived
the court of jurisdiction. 176 Schwab has not appealed the district court’s
dismissal. 177 Thus, the FINRA Rules have not been enjoined, and the
FINRA complaint against Schwab is wending its way through the
administrative process. The SEC, which earlier approved the FINRA
Rules, may eventually be called upon to determine whether Schwab’s
class action waiver violates them, and a federal court of appeals may
ultimately review the SEC’s decision and determine the validity of the
FINRA Rules. 178 In so doing, a court likely will need to determine the
extent to which FINRA’s (or the SEC’s) interpretation of the federal
securities laws is entitled to Chevron deference, as will the Supreme
Court if it ultimately reviews the appellate court’s decision.
C. Chevron Deference, if Any, Owed to these Agency Actions
Professor Paul Kirgis put his finger on the Legal Process issue that
the NLRB decision and the FINRA Rules present: “they will likely pit
the ‘federal policy favoring arbitration’ that the Supreme Court has
divined from the [FAA] against the principle of deference to agency
decision-making enshrined in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.” 179 In other words, since the NLRB ruling and
the FINRA Rules invalidate class action waivers in certain
circumstances, the Supreme Court may eventually have to determine
whether these agency actions are entitled to deference under Chevron
even if they conflict with Concepcion and the Court’s other proarbitration precedents. 180
2012).
175. Charles Schwab, 2012 WL 1859030, at *1.
176. Id. at *5–10. See also id. at *2, *5 (providing an overview of the disciplinary process).
177. Email from Gilbert Serota, Attorney for Charles Schwab & Co., to author (June 13, 2012,
16:26 EDT) (on file with author).
178. See supra note 172 (discussing the administrative and judicial review steps in the
disciplinary process).
179. Kirgis, supra note 131 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984)).
180. The use of the generic phrase “Chevron deference” belies a continuum of deference
regimes that the Supreme Court has applied over the years in various circumstances. See William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098–1120
(2008) (describing the continuum of deference regimes); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Kevin S.
Schwartz, Chevron and Agency Norm-Entrepreneurship, 115 YALE L.J. 2623, 2629–30 (2006)
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This Section begins with a brief introduction to the Court’s decision
in Chevron, which mandates deference to an agency’s interpretation of
legislation within its regulatory authority, and then turns to the
interesting Chevron-related issues that the NLRB ruling and the FINRA
Rules raise. In the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, the Chevron
“decision has become foundational, even a quasi-constitutional text—
the undisputed starting point for any assessment of the allocation of
authority between federal courts and administrative agencies.” 181
1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
In Chevron, an environmental group, the Natural Resources Defense
Council (“NRDC”), challenged a regulation promulgated by the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977. 182 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had struck
down the EPA regulation, but the Supreme Court held that an agency’s
interpretation of a statute within its purview is entitled to deference:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue.
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute. 183

Under Chevron’s second step, regulations that an agency issues
pursuant to an express delegation of authority from Congress are
“binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or
(noting a continuum); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (differentiating between Chevron’s two-step regime and the multifactor approach embodied in the Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). For a
recent look on Chevron and its history, see Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of
Chevron on the Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI L.J. 143 (2012).
181. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006). Professor
Richard Pierce goes further, calling Chevron “one of the most important constitutional law
decisions in history” Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J.
2225, 2227 (1997) [hereinafter Pierce, Reconciling Chevron]. But see Eskridge & Baer, supra
note 180, at 1090 (“[T]he Court usually does not apply Chevron to cases that are . . . Chevroneligible.”); id. at 1120 (“Chevron is not the alpha and the omega of Supreme Court agencydeference jurisprudence.”).
182. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
183. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted).
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capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” 184 Even
where Congress has not expressly delegated authority to implement a
particular statutory provision,
it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority
and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses
ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one
about which “Congress did not actually have an intent” as to a
particular result. 185

In the Legal Process class I used to teach, after reading Chevron, we
considered the reasons why legislation is often ambiguous, 186 and we
debated which institution of government should have authority to
resolve the ambiguities. In considering whether and why agency
interpretations are entitled to deference, 187 we observed that Congress
not only expressly delegates authority to agencies to interpret statutes
through the promulgation of regulations, but it impliedly delegates
authority to agencies by leaving gaps or ambiguities in statutes they
administer. We also noted that agency administrators often have greater
subject matter expertise than generalist judges. We recognized that
while agency administrators are not popularly elected, the heads of
agencies are appointed (and confirmed) by elected officials and
therefore have greater (if indirect) political accountability than federal
judges. Finally, we debated whether deference to agency interpretations
promotes legislative supremacy. 188 Thus, we discussed the extent to
which implied congressional intent, differing institutional competencies,

184. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (citing, inter alia, Chevron, 467
U.S. at 844) (footnote omitted); see also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011) (citing the “arbitrary or capricious” standard under Chevron’s
second step). Substantial deference is owed to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63
(1997). In fact, an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations “must be given ‘controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (citation omitted); accord Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
185. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
186. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (identifying congressional preference to have expert
agency decide specific issues, congressional inattention, and political stalemate). See also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1244–47 (1989) (discussing congressional deference to
expert agencies and an interest in retaining political cover).
187. Sunstein contends that the Court in Chevron “announced its two-step approach without
giving a clear sense of the theory that justified it.” Sunstein, supra note 181, at 195.
188. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44, 865–66. See also Eskridge & Schwartz, supra note 180, at
2626–27 (observing that agencies are in many ways more accountable than the judiciary because
they issue rules following both notice and public comment, and are directly accountable to both
the President and Congress); Pierce, Reconciling Chevron, supra note 181, at 2228–37.
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and separation of powers concerns counsel in favor of deference to
agency action. 189
The NLRB ruling and the FINRA Rules would not only facilitate a
discussion of the theoretical rationales underlying Chevron deference,
but they would provide the Legal Process students with an opportunity
to apply the Chevron analysis to discrete new sets of facts. The students
could scrutinize the texts of the NLRA and the Securities Exchange Act
and their legislative histories to determine whether the laws “directly
spoke” to the question of the enforceability of class action waivers. 190
If the first step was satisfied, the students could move onto the second
step, debating whether the NLRB decision in Horton offered a wellreasoned explanation why class action waivers frustrate the rights of
employees to engage in “concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or
protection,” 191 and whether the SEC reasonably concluded that the
FINRA Rules or their predecessors were designed “to protect investors
and the public interest.” 192
While the NLRB ruling and FINRA Rules would provide great
vehicles for exploring these Chevron basics, the Legal Process students
could dig deeper into the Chevron analysis, puzzling over a few of the
dicier issues raised by these administrative actions, namely: (1) when an
entity is considered a governmental agency entitled to Chevron
deference; (2) when a ruling has the force of law or procedural formality
required to qualify for Chevron deference; and (3) whether agency
actions are entitled to deference if they address matters beyond the
agency’s subject matter expertise. In other words, the students could
consider the scope of “Chevron’s domain.” 193 This Part will briefly
examine these issues in turn.
2. Is FINRA a Government Agency Eligible for Chevron Deference?
In most cases involving Chevron deference, the agency’s status as a
governmental agency is unquestioned. Typically, Congress creates an
administrative agency and delegates to it certain responsibilities by
statute. The NLRB fits into this standard mold: Congress enacted the

189. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 836 (“Chevron rests on an implied delegation
from Congress . . . . Congress has ultimate authority over the scope of the Chevron doctrine, and
. . . the courts should attend carefully to the signals Congress sends about its interpretive
wishes.”).
190. Accord Kirgis, supra note 131.
191. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012), cited in D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *2 (Jan. 3,
2012). See also supra Part II.A (discussing Horton).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2012), cited in SEC Release, supra note 170, at *3.
193. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 835.
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NLRA in 1935, creating the NLRB and delegating to it authority to
make rules and regulations necessary to carry out its provisions.194
Other agencies, such as the EPA (the focus of Chevron itself), are
created by executive order. 195
FINRA’s status as a government agency is less obvious than either
the NLRB or the EPA because the NYSE and the NASD, the
enforcement arms of which were merged to create FINRA, 196 began as
voluntary organizations of broker-dealers and operated for decades as
SROs. 197 Yet today, FINRA conducts disciplinary actions and
promulgates rules that govern the industry—functions that appear to be
governmental. 198 So is FINRA a government agency eligible for
Chevron deference?
To qualify as an agency under the Administrative Procedures Act, an
entity or person must be an “authority of the Government of the United
States.” 199 The question then becomes in what circumstances does a
person or entity qualify as an “authority”? According to one leading
treatise, an agency must have the power to take legally binding action,
to make final dispositions, or to perform governmental functions.200
Does FINRA meet these standards?
Professor Roberta Karmel, former Commissioner of the SEC, former
director of the NYSE and former member of the National Adjudicatory
Council of the NASD, 201 has written a thoughtful article on FINRA’s
status vel non as a government agency. 202 Karmel does not focus on the
Chevron deference issue per se, but rather on FINRA’s immunity from
suit, the preemptive force of its rules and the constitutional rights of

194. Pub. L. No. 74-198, §§ 3, 6, 49 Stat. 449, 451–52 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 153, 156 (2012)). See also Exec. Order 6763 (June 29, 1934), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14708#axzz1yMf4r3PI (stating that prior to
enactment of the NLRA, President Franklin Roosevelt had issued an executive order creating an
NLRB).
195. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (July 9, 1970), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. at 202 (2006). See also Executive Order 11,548, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,677 (July 20, 1970)
(specifying responsibilities to be vested in the Administrator of the EPA).
196. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing the creation of FINRA).
197. Karmel, supra note 160, at 153, 158.
198. Id. at 159.
199. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012).
200. I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.2, at 4–5 (5th ed. 2010).
201. Karmel, supra note 160, at 151 n.a1.
202. See id. at 152 (“[C]ategorizing FINRA as a government agency, at this time, would not
necessarily be useful . . . but when FINRA is exercising investigative and disciplinary functions it
should be treated like a government agency.”); id. at 159 (“[W]ith respect to at least some of its
activities, and in particular disciplinary actions and rule-making, FINRA will be performing
functions that can be considered governmental.”).

3_WASSERMAN.DOCX

424

12/14/2012 3:59 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

persons it investigates and prosecutes. 203 Karmel notes that the origins
of FINRA’s regulatory authority were contractual, not governmental—
“a matter of private contract between the NYSE and its members.” 204
Moreover, with respect to its disciplinary actions and rule-making,
“FINRA [performs] functions that can be considered governmental.” 205
In all likelihood, the courts will sidestep the question of FINRA’s
status as a government agency because the SEC, created by Congress in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 206 and whose status as a
governmental agency is unquestioned, has expansive power to oversee
the arbitration procedures employed by FINRA. 207 FINRA Rules must
receive SEC approval before they become effective. 208 Moreover, the
SEC has statutory authority to “abrogate, add to and delete from”
existing FINRA and other SRO rules,209 as well as de novo authority to
cancel, reduce or set aside sanctions imposed by FINRA. 210 For these
reasons, courts have treated FINRA Rules as having the “force and
effect” of federal regulations, 211 and as a result it seems quite likely that
the FINRA rules are eligible for Chevron deference. 212 The Legal

203. Id. at 171–98.
204. Id. at 196. See also id. at 168 (“[I]t is no[] longer a voluntary SRO.” (emphasis
omitted)).
205. Id. at 159.
206. Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d
(2012)).
207. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227–33 (1987) (describing the
SEC’s “expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the
SROs”).
208. 15 U.S.C. §78s(b)(1) (2012). See also Charles Schwab & Co. v. FINRA, No. C-12518EDL, 2012 WL 1859030, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2012) (noting that FINRA “file[d]
proposed rules with the SEC, which then had authority to approve or disapprove all proposed
rules”).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (providing that the SEC “by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete
from . . . the rules of a [SRO] . . . as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the
fair administration of the [SRO], to conform its rules to requirements of this chapter
. . . , or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter”).
210. Id. § 78s(d)–(e); Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate about
Securities Self-Regulation: It’s Time to End FINRA’s Federal Income Tax Exemption, 31 VA.
TAX REV. 135, 151 (2011).
211. Charles Schwab, 2012 WL 1859030, at *1 (“Because of the SEC’s oversight, FINRA
Rules approved by the SEC are expressions of federal legislative power and have the force and
effect of a federal regulation.”). See also Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d
1119, 1132 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he NASD arbitration procedures . . . have preemptive force over
conflicting state law.”); Karmel, supra note 160, at 183 (noting that in certain cases, “SRO rules
were essentially treated as SEC rules, and the SROs were therefore essentially regarded as state
actors”).
212. See Karmel, supra note 160, at 196 (noting that none of the cases where SRO rules have
been held to preempt federal antitrust laws “focused on the fact that an SRO rule was displacing
the antitrust laws. Rather, the focus was on the SEC’s authority and the SEC’s oversight of the
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Process students might nevertheless relish the opportunity to consider
the nature of government and why the classification as a government
agency matters.
3. Does the NLRB Ruling Have the Force of Law or Procedural
Formality to Qualify for Chevron Deference?
Even if the NLRB and FINRA (or the SEC) qualify as governmental
agencies, their rulings and rules are not entitled to Chevron deference
unless they have authority “to make rules carrying the force of law” and
their interpretations were “promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.” 213 According to the Supreme Court in United States v. Mead
Corp., tariff classifications issued by the United States Customs Service
“are beyond the Chevron pale,” 214 as are interpretations in opinion
letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, 215 although these classifications and interpretations may be
“entitled to respect” to the extent they have the “power to persuade.” 216
In concluding that tariff classifications are ineligible for Chevron
deference, the Court in Mead noted that 46 different Customs Service
offices churned out between 10,000 and 15,000 tariff classifications per
year, suggesting a lack of intent that its cursory rulings, issued without
great deliberation and care, would have the force of law. 217 This
threshold inquiry into a rule’s “force of law,” which logically precedes
the Chevron two-step analysis, is part of the Chevron “step zero”
inquiry, 218 which asks “whether the Chevron framework applies at
all.” 219
In determining whether Congress delegated an agency authority to
“make rules carrying the force of law,” the Court observed that

conduct in question”).
213. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see also id. at 232
(“[I]nterpretive rules . . . enjoy no Chevron status as a class.”); Eskridge & Schwartz, supra note
180, at 2627 (“Chevron does not apply unless Congress has delegated authority to create binding
legal orders or rules.”); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 837 (“Congress impliedly
delegates the power to interpret only when it grants the agency power to take action that binds the
public with the force of law.”).
214. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
215. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
216. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
217. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233–34.
218. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 836 (coining the phrase); Sunstein,
supra note 181, at 191 & n.19 (borrowing the phrase for the article’s title).
219. Sunstein, supra note 181, at 191. A separate part of the “step zero” inquiry asks whether
a fundamental issue that goes to the heart of the regulatory scheme is involved, in which case the
amount of deference owed is reduced on the theory that Congress has not delegated agencies
authority to resolve such fundamental issues. Id. at 193.
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“[d]elegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as
by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional
intent.” 220 For example, in a 2011 decision, the Court concluded that a
Treasury Department rule was entitled to Chevron deference, noting
that “[t]he Department issued the . . . rule only after notice-andcomment procedures, . . . a consideration identified in our precedents as
a ‘significant’ sign that a rule merits Chevron deference.” 221 The
FINRA Rules at issue here were adopted after a notice-and-comment
period 222 and therefore appear to satisfy Chevron “step zero.”
But what of the NLRB ruling? While rules adopted after a noticeand-comment period may exemplify the type of administrative
formality that merits Chevron deference, the Court has frequently
accorded such deference to formal agency adjudications as well. 223 The
220. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27; see also id. at 230–31 (“[T]he overwhelming number of our
cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or
formal adjudication. That said, and as significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to
Chevron authority, the want of that procedure . . . does not decide the case, for we have
sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was
required and none was afforded . . . .”) (footnote and citations omitted); Sunstein, supra note 182,
at 223 (“[T]he relationship among ‘force of law,’ formal procedure, and Chevron deference is
confusing.”). Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts are careful to differentiate between
rules that have the force of law (violations of which subject the violator to a sanction) and
interpretive rules or procedure rules, which lack the force of law and impose no sanction.
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original
Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 472, 474, 582–87 (2002) (discussing Congress’s original
convention for distinguishing between legislative and housekeeping rules and advocating that it
be adopted as a canon of interpretation).
221. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011)
(citations omitted).
222. See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Adopting FINRA Rules Regarding Books
and Records in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63784 (Jan.
27, 2011) (approving FINRA Rule 2268 following a notice-and-comment period); SEC Approves
Consolidated FINRA Rules Governing Books and Records, Regulatory Notice 11-19 (Apr. 2011)
(announcing the implementation date of FINRA Rule 2268); Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Adoption of NASD Rules 12000 Through 14000 Series as FINRA Rules
in the New Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58643 (Sept. 25,
2008) (approving a proposal to include the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes
in the consolidated FINRA Rulebook following a notice-and-comment period); SEC Approves
New Consolidated FINRA Rules, FINRA Announces SEC Approval and Effective Date for New
Consolidated FINRA Rules, Regulatory Notice 08-57 (Oct. 2008) (announcing the
implementation date for the first phase of the new consolidated FINRA Rules). See also Eskridge
& Baer, supra note 180, at 1186 & n.321 (identifying “almost two dozen statutes that regularly
trigger Chevron deference,” including the Securities Exchange Act).
223. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 & n.12 (citing cases). The Court has deferred to agency
interpretations adopted through even less formal means. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
221–22 (2002) (“[T]he fact that the Agency previously reached its interpretation through means
less formal than ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking does not automatically deprive that
interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its due. . . . [T]he interstitial nature of the legal
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Supreme Court in Mead explained, “[i]t is fair to assume generally that
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law
when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a
pronouncement of such force.” 224
The NLRA, which sets out the NLRB’s adjudicatory process,
requires that testimony be reduced to writing and that the Board “state
its findings of fact”; it authorizes individuals to seek review in the court
of appeals if they are aggrieved by a final Board order. 225 These
statutorily required procedural protections are designed to ensure
deliberation and the fairness of the process. Interestingly, while the
NLRB’s adjudicatory process affords these protections, the Board must
petition a court to enforce its orders, 226 suggesting that its rulings may
nevertheless lack the force of law. 227 The Supreme Court has regularly
deferred to NLRB rulings notwithstanding the non-self-executing nature
of NLRB rulings. 228 In fact, Mead cited cases deferring to NLRB
rulings to illustrate that agency adjudications may be sufficiently formal
to qualify for Chevron deference. 229
Is it enough, then, that Congress has authorized the NLRB to engage
in formal adjudication or must it have power to enter self-executing
orders? The answer may depend on the theoretical rationale for
Chevron deference. On the one hand, if Chevron rests principally on
question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to the administration
of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has
given the question over a long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate
lens through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation . . . .”). See also Sunstein,
supra note 181, at 216–19 (discussing Barnhart and its case-by-case inquiry into the
interpretative method used).
224. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
225. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012).
226. Id. § 160(e).
227. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 180, at 1123–24 & n.152 (explaining that the Supreme
Court has assumed the NLRB has law-making authority despite lacking the ability to enforce its
own orders); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 838–39 n.23 (“NLRB adjudications are not
entitled to Chevron deference because NLRB orders are not self-executing.”); Sunstein, supra
note 181, at 223, 247–48 & n.252 (“As I have noted, some agency actions do not have force of
law, even if based on formal procedures (e.g., the decisions of the NLRB).”).
228. See, e.g., Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 408–09 (1996) (according Chevron
deference to a decision of the NLRB that classified “live-haul” workers as covered employees
rather than as exempt agricultural laborers); ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324–
25 (1994) (according Chevron deference to a decision of the NLRB that ordered the reinstatement
of an employee who had provided false testimony before the administrative law judge). See also
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 180, at 1124 n.152 & 1186 & n.321 (identifying the NLRA as a
statute “that regularly trigger[s] Chevron deference”).
229. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 n.12 (citing, inter alia, Holly Farms, 517 U.S. at 408–09; ABF
Freight Sys., 510 U.S. at 324–25).
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implied congressional intent, and if “the decision by Congress to require
agencies to seek judicial enforcement of their orders . . . [implies] that
Congress did not intend to delegate primary interpretational authority to
such an agency,” 230 then only agencies with power to enter selfexecuting orders should be entitled to Chevron deference. On the other
hand, if the principal rationale for deference is institutional competency
or agency expertise, then agency actions that are the product of
procedures formal enough to ensure deliberation should be entitled to
deference, even if they are not self-executing. Surely the NLRB’s
decision in Horton would provide the Legal Process students with a
meaningful opportunity to explore Chevron’s “step zero” and to
consider the types of agency actions that qualify for Chevron deference.
4. Do the NLRB Ruling and the FINRA Rules Trench upon Federal
Policies beyond the Agencies’ Authority?
While these “step zero” issues would provoke lively discussions in
the Legal Process class, the issue that really would engage the students,
I think, is the scope of Chevron deference. Assuming that both the
NLRB and FINRA (or at least the SEC) qualify as agencies and their
rules and rulings have the force of law or are the product of sufficient
procedural formality to qualify for Chevron deference, what happens if
their rules or rulings conflict with policy objectives underlying other
federal laws? Stated differently, is the portion of the NLRB decision
that concluded that it did not conflict with the FAA entitled to Chevron
deference? To the extent that FINRA (or the SEC) concluded that its
Rules are valid notwithstanding Concepcion, is its reading entitled to
deference? Here, several formidable arguments against deference
deserve mention.
First, the Supreme Court has declined to defer to the NLRB’s
interpretation of a statute “far removed from its expertise” 231 and has
“never deferred to the Board’s remedial preferences where such
preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and policies
unrelated to the NLRA.” 232
For example, in Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, the Board had ordered a company, Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, to offer reinstatement and back pay to four
employees it had fired due to union organizing activity in violation of
230. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 892.
231. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 143–44 (2001) (citing S. S.S.
Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 40–46 (1942)).
232. Id. at 144 (emphasis added); see id. at 147 (“[W]here the Board’s chosen remedy
trenches upon a federal statute or policy outside the Board’s competence to administer, the
Board’s remedy may be required to yield.”).
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the NLRA. 233
One of the employees, Jose Castro, was an
undocumented worker, who had initially gained employment with
Hoffman by offering a friend’s birth certificate to establish his
eligibility. 234 Castro’s use of another person’s documents to obtain
employment violated the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(“IRCA”), which bars both an employer’s knowing hiring of
unauthorized aliens and a prospective employee’s use of false
documents, or the documents of another, to obtain employment.235
Since “awarding back pay to illegal aliens runs counter to the policies
underlying IRCA, policies the Board had no authority to enforce or
administer,” 236 the Court held that the “award lies beyond the bounds of
the Board’s remedial discretion.” 237
Here, the NLRB ruling and the FINRA Rules involve more than
exercises of “remedial discretion.” The FINRA Rules are prophylactic
measures designed to ensure that brokerage customers have the
opportunity to pursue class action litigation in court (rather than a
particular remedy should they prove their claim). Likewise, the NLRB
ruling clarifies the right of employees to press their claims collectively
(regardless of the remedy sought), and defines an unfair labor practice.
Even if these rules and ruling are not remedial in nature, however, they
may “trench upon” the policies that the Concepcion Court has read into
the FAA, and their entitlement to deference may be questioned on that
ground.
Second and related, where statutes—like the Freedom of Information
Act or the Administrative Procedures Act—apply to all or most
administrative agencies, it is “universally agreed that no single agency
with enforcement power has been charged with administration of these
statutes, and hence that Chevron does not apply.” 238 Since the FAA
applies broadly and neither the NLRB nor FINRA (nor the SEC) is
charged with its enforcement, the FINRA Rules and the NLRB ruling
are not entitled to Chevron deference to the extent they interpret the
FAA. Thus, the Board’s conclusion that its decision accommodates the
233. Id. at 140 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)).
234. Id. at 141.
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012).
236. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added).
237. Id. See id. at 151 (“[A]llowing the Board to award back pay to illegal aliens would
unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as
expressed in IRCA.”).
238. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 893. See also Sunstein, supra note 181, at 209
(“Agencies are not given Chevron deference when they are interpreting the Freedom of
Information Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and other statutes that cut across a wide
range of agencies.”).

3_WASSERMAN.DOCX

430

12/14/2012 3:59 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

FAA is likely not entitled to Chevron deference because the NLRB is
not charged with administration of the FAA.
But even if the NLRB’s or FINRA’s interpretations of the FAA are
not themselves entitled to Chevron deference, portions of their
respective ruling and rules may be. In particular, the portion of the
NLRB ruling finding that class action waivers violate the NLRA should
be eligible for deference under Chevron and Mead because the agency
has authority to adjudicate claims arising under the labor statute.
Likewise, the FINRA Rules may be eligible for Chevron deference
because they embody a permissible interpretation of the Securities
Exchange Act, a statute within the SEC’s purview. If this much is
correct, however, a court will still have to decide how to resolve the
conflict between the NLRA, as interpreted by the NLRB in Horton, or
the Exchange Act, as interpreted in the FINRA Rules, and the FAA, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Concepcion.
Here, a third argument comes into play: Chevron deference “does not
trump prior interpretations of statutes adopted by the Court itself.” 239
Not only has the Supreme Court held that its own interpretations of a
statute are entitled to stare decisis effect and form the backdrop against
which agency actions are assessed, 240 but the Courts of Appeals have
declined to defer to agency decisions interpreting Supreme Court
precedent. 241 As the D.C. Circuit explained (in a case involving a
decision of the Federal Election Commission):
We are not obliged to defer to an agency’s interpretation of Supreme
Court precedent under Chevron or any other principle.
The
Commission’s assertion that Congress and the Court are equivalent in

239. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 839. See also Neal v. United States, 516 U.S.
284, 295 (1996) (“Once we have determined a statute’s meaning, we adhere to our ruling under
the doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against
that settled law.”) (citations omitted); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 915 (“The Supreme
Court has consistently ruled that agency interpretations of statutes that deviate from the Court’s
own precedents are not entitled to Chevron deference.”); Pierce, Reconciling Chevron, supra note
181, at 2226 (describing the Supreme Court’s “mechanical rule” that its own “precedents always
trump the deference owed under Chevron”); id. at 2259–62 (criticizing the Court’s mechanical
rule and proposing an alternate methodology for reconciling conflicts between Chevron and stare
decisis); Rebecca Hanner White, The Stare Decisis “Exception” to the Chevron Deference Rule,
44 FLA. L. REV. 723, 726–29 (1992) (proposing an approach for resolving tension between
Chevron and stare decisis).
240. Neal, 516 U.S. at 295; Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536–37 (1992)..
241. See, e.g., NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 660 F.3d 65, 68–69 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[A] court of
appeals is ‘not obligated to defer to an agency’s interpretation of the Supreme Court precedent
under Chevron.’” (citations omitted)); New York New York, LLC v. NLRB, 313 F.3d 585, 590
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (repeating the principle that “the Board’s judgment is not entitled to judicial
deference”); Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that
agency interpretation of Supreme Court precedent is not entitled to deference).
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this respect is inconsistent with Chevron’s basic premise. Chevron
recognized that Congress delegates policymaking functions to
agencies, so deference by the courts to agencies’ statutory
interpretations of ambiguous language is appropriate. But the
Supreme Court does not, of course, have a similar relationship to
agencies, and agencies have no special qualifications of legitimacy in
interpreting Court opinions. There is therefore no reason for courts—
the supposed experts in analyzing judicial decisions—to defer to
agency interpretations of the Court’s opinions. 242

Thus, the NLRB’s and FINRA’s interpretations of Concepcion may not
be entitled to Chevron deference.
If portions of the NLRB ruling and FINRA Rules (interpreting the
NLRA and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, respectively) remain
eligible for Chevron deference, how will the apparent conflict with the
FAA be resolved and by whom? Which statute’s policy must give way?
Neither the NLRB nor FINRA (nor the SEC) has authority to enforce
the FAA, and their interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Concepcion are not likely entitled to deference. 243 Thus, it appears
likely that the courts (and ultimately the Supreme Court itself) will be
called upon to resolve this conflict between federal policies. Given its
strong pro-arbitration policy, it would not be surprising if the Court
ultimately concludes that the NLRB ruling and the FINRA Rules
“trench” upon the pro-arbitration policy that the Court has read into the
FAA.
In all events, the class action waiver materials would offer the Legal
Process students a wonderful opportunity to explore a host of issues
lying under the surface of Chevron, and to reflect upon the nature of
administrative agencies, their relationships with both Congress and the
Court, and their role in the interpretation and development of law.
III. THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS AND THE SUPREME COURT
My Legal Process course not only examined the dynamic
relationships among Congress, the Supreme Court and administrative
agencies, but it analyzed the uses of precedent, 244 the values of adhering
to precedent, 245 and the reasons for occasionally overruling
242. Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S.
11 (1998).
243. See supra notes 231–34 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s reluctance to
defer to agency decisions that conflict with prior interpretations of statutes by the Court).
244. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY
72–76 (1960) (differentiating between strict and loose views of precedent).
245. See, e.g., Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 119, at 1364–67 (citing
institutional competency, legislative acquiescence and practical reliance as rationales for adhering
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precedent. 246 Because this was a first-semester, first-year course, we
began with an examination of the judicial system—of parallel state and
federal court systems, each with appellate courts that review lower court
decisions. We assumed that when the Supreme Court announces an
interpretation of the law, the lower courts follow its decision, whether
the Court gets it right or not. As Professors Frank Cross and Emerson
Tiller asserted, lower courts “are presumed to adhere to the selfenforcing principle of stare decisis and to apply the doctrines of higher
courts to the particular facts of the underlying case.” 247 As political
scientist John Gruhl described the hierarchical model over thirty years
ago, the Supreme Court renders “authoritative decisions” and we
assume that the lower courts “obey[] the dictates of the Supreme
Court.” 248
Once the students examined the hierarchical model, we considered
whether the courts’ respective roles in interpretation and law-making
might be more complex than the conventional wisdom suggests. Does
the actual relationship among the courts differ from the traditional
hierarchical model, and if so, how?
A. The Lower Courts as Change Agents
Professor Hillel Levin suggests that the Supreme Court’s recent
pleading decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 249 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 250 as well as its earlier summary judgment trilogy, 251 confound
to statutory precedents); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)
(“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity
over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”) (citation omitted).
246. See, e.g., Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 119, at 1369–84
(analyzing procedural laxity, implied delegation of law-making authority by Congress to the
Court, and lack of reliance as reasons why the Supreme Court occasionally reconsiders its own
statutory precedents). See also Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 854–55 (“[W]hen this Court
reexamines a prior holding, . . . we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply
in defying practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend .
. . hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant
of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to
have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.”).
247. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2155 (1998).
248. John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law of Libel: Compliance by Lower
Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502, 502 (1980). Gruhl’s study of lower court compliance with
Supreme Court decisions on libel law supports the hierarchical model: “The Court drastically
altered doctrine which had remained relatively stable throughout most of the country’s history,
and it got the lower courts to comply immediately and overwhelmingly.” Id. at 518–19.
249. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
250. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See also Edward Brunet, The Efficiency of
Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 689, 694 (stating that Iqbal and Twombly cast a “sea of
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the common wisdom regarding the relationship between the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts. 252 In both sets of cases, he posits,
the changes in the law were not initiated by the Supreme Court, but
rather by the lower courts, which had long been pushing for heightened
pleading requirements and had been using summary judgment
“expansively to dismiss apparently meritless cases for quite a long time
before the Court jumped on the bandwagon.” 253 In neither case, Levin
argues, did the Supreme Court pronounce a bold change in procedural
law, which the lower courts then meekly followed. 254 Levin believes
that “[a]t most, the Supreme Court has been a lag indicator for what was
already happening in the lower courts.” 255
Levin generalizes from the summary judgment and pleading
examples to question whether
our general view of the relationship between the Supreme Court and
the lower courts may be backwards. It is not necessarily, as we tend to
assume, that if we read Supreme Court opinions we can deduce what
lower courts will do (under the assumption that they follow
precedent); rather it is that we can read lower court opinions and
deduce where the Supreme Court may end up. 256

Thus, Levin presents two competing views of the relationship between
the Supreme Court and the lower courts. In the conventional
hierarchical view, the Supreme Court announces changes in the
interpretation of the law and the lower courts obediently follow. In
Levin’s alternative view, it is the lower courts, motivated by docket
pressures perhaps, that push for changes in the law and the Supreme
Court that eventually follows their lead.
B. The Lower Courts as Brakes on Change
The class action waiver cases suggest yet a third view of the lower
courts’ role vis-à-vis the Supreme Court. Rather than obedient
followers or catalysts for change, the lower courts are sometimes
reluctant, even recalcitrant, forces that resist the Supreme Court’s

doubt” around Rule 12(b)(6) motions and caused commentators to “reexamine summary
judgment in the context of major pleading changes”).
251. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
252. Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 143, 144–45, 149–52 (2010).
253. Id. at 150.
254. Id. at 149.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 152.

3_WASSERMAN.DOCX

434

12/14/2012 3:59 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

attempts to change law on an issue. 257
In the years preceding Concepcion, a number of lower courts
invalidated class action waivers in arbitration clauses on the theory that
they were unconscionable under state law 258 or interfered with the
enforcement of statutory rights. 259 The Supreme Court called both of
these theories into question in the last year. In Concepcion, the
Supreme Court made clear—or attempted to make clear—that class
action waivers are enforceable notwithstanding state unconscionability
law because collective action interferes with the FAA objective of
“‘encourag[ing] efficient and speedy dispute resolution.’” 260 In the
Court’s words, “Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration
interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.” 261 The Court in Concepcion
concluded that California’s unconscionability case law is preempted by
the FAA because it “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” 262
Likewise, in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, decided less than a
year after Concepcion, the Supreme Court made clear that the FAA
257. Perhaps the most recent notable illustration of a “resistant” court is the Montana Supreme
Court. See W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011) (upholding a
Montana law that prohibited independent political expenditures by corporations, notwithstanding
the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010)), rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per
curiam). See id. at 13 (finding that Montana has a compelling interest in prohibiting certain
political expenditures). In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court summarily reversed, stating
that “Montana’s arguments in support of the judgment below either were already rejected in
Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.” Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at
2491.
258. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (“[W]hen the
[class action] waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes
between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is
alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then, at least to the
extent the obligation at issue is governed by California law, the . . . waivers are unconscionable
under California law and should not be enforced.”), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
259. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 320 (2d Cir. 2009) (“AmEx
I”) (“[T]he class action waiver . . . cannot be enforced . . . because to do so would grant Amex de
facto immunity from antitrust liability by removing plaintiffs’ only reasonably feasible means of
recovery. . . . [W]e have relied here on a vindication of statutory rights analysis, which is part of
the federal substantive law of arbitrability.”), vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).
260. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 221 (1985)); see also supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Concepcion Court’s focus on
efficiency).
261. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
262. Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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requires the enforcement of arbitration agreements even when the
claimants present federal statutory claims, “unless the FAA’s mandate
has been ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’” 263 Even
where a federal statute requires companies to inform consumers that
they “have a right to sue” 264 in the event of a statutory violation and
even where the statute invalidates any waiver by a consumer of any
protection under the law, 265 the Court concluded that a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement is enforceable because the disclosure provision
creates no right to sue in court. 266 Instead, the Court read the “right to
sue” language in the statute as describing the consumer’s right to
enforce the law’s requirements, but not necessarily in court. 267
In light of these recent Supreme Court decisions, and applying the
traditional hierarchical model, one would expect that when employees
or consumers challenge the enforceability of class action waivers, trial
courts and intermediate appellate courts would reject unconscionability
defenses, citing Concepcion, and would be skeptical of arguments
claiming a statutory right to sue in court or to proceed collectively, in
light of CompuCredit. And while most lower courts have followed
these courses and have upheld class action waivers, 268 interestingly, not
all have. The following Sections focus on a few decisions that either
have struck down a class action waiver notwithstanding Concepcion, or
at least have read the Court’s recent opinions narrowly. These cases
suggest that the lower courts do not always obediently follow Supreme

263. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (quoting Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)).
264. Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) (2012).
265. Id. § 1679f(a).
266. CompuCredit Corp., 132 S. Ct. at 669–70.
267. Id. at 670.
268. See, e.g., Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1158 & n.2, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012)
(viewing Concepcion as “broadly written”; reading the Court’s “statutory rights” cases as
“limited to federal statutory rights”; and concluding that “Concepcion controls, [and] the FAA
preempts the Washington state law invalidating the class-action waiver”) (emphasis added);
Quilloin v. Tenet Healthsystem Phil., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Pennsylvania
law prohibiting class action waivers is surely preempted by the FAA under Concepcion . . . .”)
(citation omitted). See also PUBLIC CITIZEN & NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES,
JUSTICE DENIED: ONE YEAR LATER: THE HARMS TO CONSUMERS FROM THE SUPREME COURT’S
CONCEPCION DECISION ARE PLAINLY EVIDENT 4 (April 2012), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/concepcion-anniversary-justice-denied-report.pdf
(“[Corporations have frequently invoked Concepcion to argue that consumers’ claims should not
be pursued collectively but, rather, individually.
Courts have usually accepted these
arguments.”); Sternlight, supra note 73, at 708 (“Most courts are rejecting all potential
distinctions and are instead applying Concepcion broadly as a ‘get out of class actions free’
card.”); Weston, supra note 73, at 115–18 (surveying cases enforcing class action waivers postConcepcion).
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Court precedents, but rather sometimes resist changes in the law by
reading the Court’s decisions narrowly, drawing fine distinctions or
otherwise seeking to limit the extent of the change in the law wrought
by Supreme Court decisions.
1. State and Federal Courts Invalidate Representative Action Waivers
in PAGA Cases
Both state and federal courts in California 269 have held that
Concepcion does not govern representative actions brought under the
California Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”). 270 In
Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., the employment application completed
by store employees incorporated by reference the company’s arbitration
policy, which barred any dispute from being “heard or arbitrated on a
class action basis, as a private attorney general, or on bases involving
claims or disputes brought in a representative capacity . . . .” 271 PAGA
permits an employee to sue an employer for violations of the state labor
code “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former
employees” to recover a civil penalty. 272 In PAGA representative
actions, the named plaintiff acts as a private attorney general. 273 The
primary goal of a PAGA action is not restitution—prevailing employees
receive only 25% of the recovery 274—but rather enforcement of a
public right that otherwise would be enforced by a state agency. 275
Reading Concepcion narrowly to permit waivers of “the private
individual right of a consumer to pursue class action remedies in court
or arbitration,” 276 the California Court of Appeals in Brown concluded
that it did “not provide that a public right, such as that created under the
PAGA, can be waived if such a waiver is contrary to state law.” 277 The
state court eschewed the unconscionability doctrine (which had been
preempted in Concepcion), relying instead on the public nature of the
269. See Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 856 (Ct. App. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1910 (2012) (discussing PAGA); Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., No.
2:11-cv-06456-CJC(PJWx), 2011 WL 4595249, at *10–12 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2011).
270. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2698 et seq. (West 2012).
271. Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 857 (quoting the company’s arbitration policy, which was
incorporated by reference into the employment application).
272. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a). See also Franco v. Athens Disposal Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d
539, 555–56 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting that PAGA authorizes the recovery of civil penalties on
behalf of others).
273. Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 860. Standard class action requirements need not be
satisfied. Id. (citing Arias v. Super. Ct., 209 P.3d 923, 927 & n.2 (Cal. 2009)).
274. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i).
275. Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 860–62.
276. Id. at 861 (emphasis added).
277. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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representative action. In short, the California state court opined,
“representative actions under the PAGA do not conflict with the
purposes of the FAA. If the FAA preempted state law as to the
unenforceability of the PAGA representative action waivers, the
benefits of private attorney general actions to enforce state labor laws
would, in large part, be nullified.” 278 Thus, the court refused to enforce
the representative action waiver.
In Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc., a federal district court
in California reached the same result, albeit on a different theory,
finding that a “PAGA waiver is unconscionable because it both deprives
the individual of the right to bring a representative action and deprives
the LWDA [(Labor and Workforce Development Agency)] the benefits
of the enforcement action brought by aggrieved employees.” 279
2. Federal Appeals Court Invalidates Class Action Waiver
in Antitrust Case
Relying on neither state unconscionability doctrine nor the public
nature of the right at issue, the Second Circuit invalidated a class action
waiver in In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation because its
practical effect would have been to deny plaintiffs the opportunity to
press claims against the American Express Company (“AmEx”) that
arose under federal antitrust statutes. 280 The form agreement between
the merchants and AmEx contained a mandatory arbitration clause,
278. Id. at 863 (citation omitted). It remanded the action to the trial court to determine
whether the waiver provision, waiving the right to pursue a representative action under PAGA,
should be severed from the rest of the arbitration agreement, or whether the entire arbitration
agreement should be stricken. Id. at 864. In a footnote, the court raised the question whether
PAGA representative actions might be arbitrable. Id. at 864 n.9 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)).
279. Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 2011 WL 4595249, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2011).
The court acknowledged that a prior decision of the same court had upheld a class
action/collective action waiver applied to PAGA claims because “the arbitration of a
representative PAGA action would, like a class claim, require a more cumbersome and costlier
process in contravention to the streamlined, informal arbitral process envisioned by the FAA, and
because there is also the increased risk that erroneous decisions on a PAGA claim would go
uncorrected.” Id. at *11 (discussing Quevedo v. Macy’s, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1142–43
(C.D. Cal. 2011)).
280. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (AmEx III), 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), reh’g en
banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., No. 12-133, 81 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012). See also Gilles & Friedman,
supra note 73, at 640–47 (maintaining that the vindication of federal statutory rights doctrine
survives Concepcion but questioning its real-world impact); David Horton, Arbitration and
Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 746–67
(2012) (drawing on inalienability theory to “recalibrate the vindication of rights doctrine”);
Weston, supra note 73, at 788–91 (citing cases that invoke the need to vindicate federal statutory
rights).

3_WASSERMAN.DOCX

438

12/14/2012 3:59 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

which barred the merchants from participating as either class
representatives or as members of a class of claimants regarding any
claims subject to arbitration. 281 The Second Circuit invalidated the
waiver because the plaintiffs had demonstrated that they could not
vindicate their rights under the Sherman and Clayton antitrust statutes
through individual arbitrations. 282
The AmEx court invoked a body of Supreme Court case law
upholding the arbitrability of federal statutory claims “unless Congress
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue.” 283 Noting the Supreme Court’s
recognition “‘that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude
a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in
the arbitral forum,’” 284 the Second Circuit placed heavy emphasis on an
affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs’ expert, establishing that it would be
so expensive for the plaintiffs to arbitrate their disputes individually that
they would have to forfeit their rights under the antitrust laws. 285 Here,
because plaintiffs could not afford to pursue their federal antitrust
claims individually, the court held that the class action waiver was
unenforceable. Carefully avoiding a categorical rule, 286 the Second
Circuit declined to hold that class action waivers in antitrust actions are
per se unenforceable, concluding instead that each waiver must be
considered on its own merits. 287 Because class arbitration cannot be
ordered in the absence of an agreement, 288 the court instructed the
district court to deny AmEx’s motion to compel arbitration. 289
The Second Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc. 290 In her
opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Pooler

281. AmEx III, 667 F.3d at 209.
282. Id. at 207 n.3, 215–16. See also Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-779bbc, 2012 WL 1242318, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012) (“[T]he arbitration agreement violates
the NLRA because it includes a provision that requires [plaintiff] to give up her right under the
statute to bring claims collectively.”); id. at *6 (deferring to the NLRB’s decision in Horton and
concluding that Concepcion “is not on point because the class action waiver in that case did not
conflict with the substantive right of a federal statute”).
283. AmEx III, 667 F.3d at 215 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
284. Id. at 216 (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)).
285. Id. at 217–18.
286. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing how lower courts read Concepcion narrowly as
precluding only categorical rules).
287. AmEx III, 667 F.3d at 219.
288. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (holding
that parties that are silent on the issue of class-wide arbitration “cannot be compelled to submit
their dispute to class arbitration”); supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Stolt-Nielsen).
289. AmEx III, 667 F.3d at 219.
290. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (AmEx IV), 681 F.3d 139, 139 (2d Cir. 2012).
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(who authored the panel opinion in AmEx) emphasized that the case was
not governed by Concepcion, which focused on preemption of state
laws hostile to arbitration. 291 Rather, the Second Circuit’s analysis in
AmEx “rests squarely on a vindication of statutory rights analysis—an
issue untouched in Concepcion.” 292
3. Lower Courts Read Concepcion Narrowly to
Preclude Categorical Rules
Lower courts have sought to preserve the right to sue collectively, not
only to promote public rights (under PAGA) and federal statutory rights
(under the federal antitrust laws), but also to preserve a right to bring a
class action (notwithstanding a contractual waiver) by reading
Concepcion narrowly to preclude only categorical rules that ban class
action waivers. 293 This Section focuses on a federal district court
opinion in Coiro v. Wachovia Bank to illustrate this approach.
In a putative class action filed in federal district court in New Jersey,
the plaintiff challenged on unconscionability grounds a class action
waiver in an arbitration clause in a bank’s Deposit Agreement. 294 The
court in Coiro declined to read Concepcion as rendering class action
waivers per se enforceable. 295 Instead, it read Concepcion narrowly to
bar only categorical rules that invalidate such waivers, and concluded
that “Concepcion does not control this case.” 296 Having declined to
read Concepcion as demanding the enforcement of all class action
waivers, the court further concluded that it had to perform a “factsensitive analysis” to determine whether the particular class action
waiver at issue was unconscionable under New Jersey law. 297
To support its narrow reading of Concepcion, the court invoked a

291. Id. (Pooler, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 140 (“While Concepcion addresses state
contract rights, Amex III deals with federal statutory rights—a significant distinction.”).
292. Id. at 139.
293. See, e.g., Valentine v. WideOpen W. Fin. LLC, No. 09-C-07653, 2012 WL 1021809, at
*5–6 (N.D. Ill. March 26, 2012) (declining to read Concepcion as foreclosing challenges to
arbitration agreements or class action waivers on state law unconscionability grounds); Brewer v.
Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 491–92 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (stating that “the Supreme
Court’s preemption of [the categorical rule in] Discover Bank does not preempt all state law
defenses to contract formation,” and that “Concepcion permits state courts to apply state law
defenses to the formation of the particular contract at issue on a case-by-case basis”); Coiro v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., Civ. No. 11-3597, 2012 WL 628514, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2012) (“The
Supreme Court’s opinion in Concepcion made clear that categorical rules do not appropriately fit
within [section two’s] savings clause . . . . Concepcion does not control this case.”).
294. Coiro, 2012 WL 628514, at *1–2.
295. Id. at *4 (citing AmEx III, 667 F.3d at 212).
296. Id.
297. Id. at *4–5.
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February 2012 United States Supreme Court decision, Marmet Health
Care Center, Inc. v. Brown. 298 Marmet vacated a decision of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which had held “unenforceable all
predispute arbitration agreements that apply to claims alleging personal
injury or wrongful death against nursing homes.” 299
In concluding that the FAA preempted West Virginia’s policy against
compelled arbitration of personal injury and wrongful death claims
against nursing homes, the United States Supreme Court in Marmet held
that “West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute agreements to
arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing
homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of
claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the
FAA.” 300 As the district court in Coiro saw it, the Supreme Court in
Marmet remained open to the state court’s alternative ruling that the
particular arbitration clause was unconscionable and remanded to the
West Virginia court to “consider whether, absent [the state’s categorical
policy], the arbitration clauses [here] are unenforceable under state
common law principles that are not specific to arbitration and preempted by the FAA.” 301 Thus, the district court in Coiro relied on
Marmet to reinforce its conclusion that Concepcion does not bar a factintensive analysis of the unconscionability vel non under state law of a
class action waiver. 302
4. Placing the Lower Court Decisions within a
Broader Theoretical Context
That some lower courts have resisted Concepcion and CompuCredit,
or at least have read them narrowly, should not come as a surprise.
After all, more than sixty years ago the late Professor Karl Llewellyn
wrote that “there is no single right and accurate way of reading one
case, or of reading a bunch of cases.” 303 In his famous collection of

298. 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam). The district court in Coiro mistakenly refers to the
Court’s decision in Marmet Health Care as “Allen v. Lasalle Bank, N.A.” Coiro, 2012 WL
628514, at *4.
299. Marmet Health Care, 132 S. Ct. at 1202 (describing the opinion below, Brown ex rel.
Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 2011)).
300. Id. at 1203–04 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
301. Id. at 1204.
302. Coiro, 2012 WL 628514, at *4. After performing a fact-sensitive analysis under New
Jersey unconscionability law, the court concluded that the waiver at issue was neither
unconscionable nor otherwise unenforceable. Id. at *4–7 (noting that plaintiff could recover
treble damages and citing a lack of evidence regarding the prohibitive cost of litigating the case).
303. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 395 (1950).
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lectures, The Bramble Bush, Llewellyn noted that courts observing a
“strict” view of precedent employ “the recognized, legitimate,
honorable technique for whittling precedents away, for making . . . the
court, in its decision, free of them. It is a surgeon’s knife.” 304 Applying
this “knife,” judges can read prior opinions narrowly, limiting “the
picture of what was actually before the court and . . . hold[ing] that the
ruling made requires to be understood as thus restricted.” 305 While
Llewellyn was not speaking specifically about the means by which
lower courts can “free” themselves of unwelcome Supreme Court
precedents, the class action waiver cases demonstrate that lower courts
can (and have) employ(ed) this technique to put the brakes on even a
fast-moving train like Concepcion.
Political scientists and other scholars have sought to explain why
lower courts decline to follow, or read narrowly, certain Supreme Court
precedents. Perhaps most obviously, lower court judges may have
“personal or partisan policy preferences” that conflict with Supreme
Court decisions. 306 For example, an N.Y.U. Law Review Note
published in 1984, which found that the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit had the lowest affirmance rate of all of the courts of
appeals, 307 concluded that “the most obvious explanation—that the
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit are ideologically incompatible—
completely accounts for the low affirmance rate.” 308 A 1998 study by
Professors Cross and Tiller published in the Yale Law Journal also
found that “there is a significant political determinant to judicial
decisionmaking.” 309 This explanation is consistent with the attitudinal
model for Supreme Court decision-making, which posits that the
Justices themselves decide disputes in light of their own “ideological

304. LLEWELLYN, supra note 244, at 73.
305. Id. at 72.
306. Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2156. See also Roy W. McLeese III, Note,
Disagreement in D.C.: The Relationship between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit and Its
Implications for a National Court of Appeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048, 1048 (1984) (citing
ideological differences between the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court).
307. McLeese, supra note 306, at 1048–50 (examining the 1980–1983 Terms and finding that
the average affirmance rate for the other courts of appeals was 39.2%, while the D.C. Circuit’s
affirmance rate was only 10.4%).
308. Id. at 1048. See also id. at 1050–60 (examining three areas of ideological disagreement:
the costs and benefits of federal judicial supervision; the importance of judicial protection of
federal governmental interests; and the importance of judicial protection of individual interests);
id. at 1060–73 (considering but rejecting alternative explanations for the D.C. Circuit’s
particularly low affirmance rate); Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2159 (“In those cases in
which [Supreme Court] doctrine does not support the partisan or ideological policy preferences of
the court majority, we expect somewhat more disobedience.”).
309. Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2169.
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attitudes and values.” 310
If lower court judges are influenced by their political beliefs, why do
they ever adhere to Supreme Court precedents with which they
disagree? The most obvious explanation is “a sense of responsibility or
role orientation.” 311 As Judge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit
explained, “it is the law—and not the personal politics of individual
judges—that controls judicial decision-making in most cases resolved
by the court of appeals.” 312 This explanation comports with the legal
model for Supreme Court decision-making, which posits that the
Justices themselves (like lower court judges) decide cases based upon
the plain meaning of the statute or constitutional provision at issue, the
intent of the Framers, and prior precedents, rather than on their own
personal political or ideological beliefs. 313
Alternatively, lower courts may follow precedents because they fear
reversal by the Supreme Court. 314 But when the likelihood of appellate
review is low, judges on the courts of appeals may be less inclined to
follow Supreme Court precedents at odds with their policy preferences.
Scholars have invoked principal-agent theory to explain this dynamic,
casting the federal courts of appeals as agents of the Supreme Court. 315
310. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002). See also Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal
Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265–79
(1996) (describing the attitudinal model).
311. Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2157; see also id. at 2158 (positing that lower courts
may comply with Supreme Court precedents because they “are dutifully performing their roles as
sincere jurists, applying the principles in an ideologically (or politically) neutral manner”)
(footnote omitted).
312. Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the “Politics” of Judging:
Dispelling Some Myths about the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 620 (1985).
313. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 310, at 48–49. See Cross, supra note 310, at 255–63
(describing the traditional legal model).
314. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2158 (“[T]he lower courts fear exposure of any
noncompliance and consequent reversal.”); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive
Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1644 (1995)
(assuming that lower courts are “rational optimizers,” and will “not necessarily pick their
preferred decision” if they anticipate that the Court will agree to review and then reverse their
decision).
315. See, e.g., Tom S. Clark, A Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review, 25 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55, 76 (2008) (“By considering the role of the Supreme Court in the judicial hierarchy and
its power to review decisions from the courts of appeals, I have presented considerable evidence
that the judicial hierarchy operates within the context of a principal-agent relationship.”); Donald
R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme CourtCircuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 675 (1994) (applying principal-agent theory
to the judicial hierarchy); cf. Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the
Judicial Hierarchy, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 538 (2011) (“[T]he interaction between the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts might be more productively modeled as a type of
mixed-motive coordination game rather than a traditional principal-agent relationship.”).
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“If the circuit courts consisted of faithful agents, they would obediently
follow the policy dictates set down by the Supreme Court. But utility
maximizing appeals court judges also have their own policy
preferences, which they may seek to follow to the extent possible.”316
The Supreme Court cannot monitor the courts of appeals effectively
because it only learns of those courts of appeals decisions that are
appealed and it lacks the resources to review all of them. 317 Thus, there
is an opportunity for lower court judges to shirk their responsibility to
the Court and to advance their own policy preferences.
But lower court judges are monitored not only by the Supreme Court
itself, but also by litigants, who may appeal if the lower courts engage
in flagrant shirking, 318 and by fellow members of the appellate court
panel, whose monitoring prevents the majority from manipulating or
disregarding Supreme Court precedent. 319 Cross and Tiller refer to
these fellow circuit judges as “whistleblowers.” 320
One study of courts of appeals’ compliance with, and responsiveness
to, Supreme Court case law on search and seizure concluded that lower
court judges “appear to be relatively faithful agents of their principal,
the Supreme Court,” 321 but nevertheless pursued their own policy
preferences and frequently had “room to maneuver.” 322
The
researchers, Professors Songer, Segal and Cameron, found that “the
appeals court judges were able to shirk, thereby partially advancing
their own policy preferences, by interpretations of Supreme Court
doctrine in ambiguous situations that were not directly
noncompliant.” 323
The Supreme Court recently granted AmEx’s petition for a writ of
certiorari 324 and will soon have an opportunity to review the Second
Circuit’s opinion, which invalidated a class action waiver
notwithstanding Concepcion and CompuCredit. While the Court
declined to grant certiorari in the Brown case, 325 it may ultimately
review some or all of the theories advanced in Brown, Urbino, and
Coiro. In the meantime, these cases provide a rich opportunity to
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
2012).
325.

Songer et al., supra note 315, at 675.
Id.
Id. at 693.
Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2156.
Id. at 2156, 2159.
Songer, supra note 315, at 690.
Id. at 692–93.
Id. at 693.
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., No. 12-133, 81 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. Nov. 9,
Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1910 (2012).
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debate whether the lower courts’ readings of Concepcion and
CompuCredit were careful and appropriate or unduly narrow and
cramped, and to consider different models for judicial decision-making
and monitoring.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion advanced an agenda
found in neither the text nor the legislative history of the FAA.
Concepcion therefore invites a close examination of the relationship
between law and politics, as well as the role of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. Moreover, reactions to the Court’s decision by
Congress, federal administrative agencies, and lower courts raise a host
of provocative questions about the relationships among the branches of
government, and between the Supreme Court and the lower courts. In
particular, these reactions provoke us to rethink the meaning of
legislative primacy, the influence of federal agencies on the
development of the law, and competing conceptions of the relationship
between the Supreme Court and the lower courts.

